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1.  THE EUROPEAN UNION’S AREA OF 
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
TEN YEARS ON 
 E LSPETH GUILD AND SERGIO CARRERA 
Introduction 
In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty formally created the European Union’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which includes policing, 
judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, border controls, 
immigration, asylum and related fields that normally fall under the 
interior, justice and home affairs ministries of member states. Since then, 
the AFSJ has become one of the key political priorities for the European 
Union. Ten years have passed and the main institutional, policy, legal and 
financial foundations of this AFSJ have largely been established. During 
this time, the promulgation of AFSJ EU law and policy has been sensitive to 
events and political dynamics at the international, European and national 
levels. This has gone hand in hand with continuing hesitations in certain 
EU member states as to the added value of having ‘more Europe’ in fields 
traditionally and deeply rooted in national sovereignty and the principle of 
subsidiarity. The intergovernmental approach has been much in evidence 
in the AFSJ but has not prevented Europeanisation from moving forward, 
something that has come as a surprise to both internal and external 
observers. Policies as diverse as border controls, immigration, asylum, 
European citizenship and freedom of movement, cooperation in criminal 
justice and police now have clear EU dimensions with profound 
implications (and challenges) not only for member states’ competences, but 
also for the liberty and security of individuals and the principles upon 2 | THE EU’S AFSJ TEN YEARS ON 
which the EU is founded. Among the most important issues for European 
cooperation on AFSJ during these last ten years has been how to ensure 
that these European norms and decision-making structures are fully 
compatible with liberal democratic principles of accountability, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights. This will remain one of the main topics to 
address in the next phase of the AFSJ. 
The Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme of December 
2009 aim at overcoming some of the dilemmas of the AFSJ by offering a 
renewed institutional and policy framework upon which the next 
generation of AFSJ measures will be built. The Lisbon Treaty does away 
with the ‘first pillar/third pillar divide’ and makes the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights legally binding. These changes will revolutionise the 
way in which the AFSJ works and the paths it is expected to take from now 
on. The third multiannual programme on AFSJ policies endorsed by the 
European Council – the Stockholm Programme – has additionally set an 
ambitious agenda for the next five years in which the kinds of common 
policies that are being developed and the evaluation of their implementation 
and  effects on fundamental human rights and the rule of law principles 
have moved to centre stage. Now a critical aspect concerns how these 
foundations and priorities are transformed into norms and practices in the 
AFSJ.  
The tenth anniversary of the AFJS and its renewed political and legal 
elements provide us with a unique opportunity to reflect on the successes 
and challenges of the last ten years of European cooperation on these 
important policies. The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Section of the 
Centre for European Policy Studies has been actively engaged in providing 
independent (policy-relevant) research assessing the major policy 
developments that have taken place during this timeframe. (See the list of 
publications in Appendix I of this volume.) The JHA Section has also 
played a role in channelling interdisciplinary academic findings and 
debates around these topics to policy-making processes at the European 
level and to the work of the main European institutions. We consider the 
occasion of the AFSJ’s tenth birthday an appropriate moment to solicit the 
views of a selected group of policy-makers and practitioners who have 
been and continue to be influential in the thinking about the contours of the 
EU’s AFSJ. This books aims at celebrating the AFSJ’s birthday by bringing 
together their first-hand accounts of the major achievements so far and the 
dilemmas ahead for the next generation of the EU’s AFSJ.  THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 3 
This book reflects upon the experiences of the first phase of the EU’s 
AFSJ (1999–2009), as well as on possible ways forward in the building of its 
next phase. The first six chapters cover several horizontal aspects related to 
the new policy and Treaty-based framework emerging from the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme. These are then complemented by a 
set of contributions focusing on some of the most important achievements 
and difficulties in specific AFSJ policy domains, in particular those related 
to asylum, border controls, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
police. This first chapter aims at setting the scene and introducing some of 
the main issues and findings of the contributions making up this collective 
volume. 
A renewed policy and treaty-based architecture for the AFSJ: The 
Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme 
The political and executive architecture of the AFSJ has been a matter of 
substantial institutional restlessness since the early 1990s. From the 
Maastricht Treaty (which first formally acknowledged the existence of a 
JHA dimension to the EU) to the Lisbon Treaty (which has given an EU 
constitutional dimension to the field), almost 20 years have passed. The 
road has not been smooth; there have been many false steps along the way. 
The end of 2009 gave the AFSJ a new institutional, decision-making and 
legal shape. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has marked a ‘before 
and after’ point in the making of the EU’s AFSJ. The new configurations 
contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the 
revised version of the Treaty on European Union provide an excellent basis 
for ambitious ways forward in European policy-making in these domains.  
One of the main deficits that has characterised EU cooperation on 
AFSJ during the last ten years has been the first/third pillar divide, which 
presented a loose institutional structure favouring intergovernmental 
approaches that often resulted in less than clear legal outputs, especially 
concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Moreover, 
the previous Treaty framework allowed for the non-applicability of the 
ordinary legislative procedure (the former co-decision procedure) to policy 
areas such as regular immigration (conditions for entry and residence) and 
the integration of non-EU nationals, and limited the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg when interpreting and reviewing adopted 
legal acts. All this has gone alongside a vulnerable setting for the protection 
of the fundamental rights of individuals. The Treaty of Lisbon has put a  
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‘formal’ end to some of these vulnerabilities through the abolition of the 
pillar structure (the expansion of the European method of cooperation). It 
has also provided new legal bases for enacting far-reaching European 
legislation, widened the competences of the Court of Justice and converted 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into a legally binding bill of rights 
for Europe. 
The institutional elements of the EU’s AFSJ have been regularly 
accompanied by strategies for setting the policy agenda. Since 1999, the 
European Council has adopted five-year political programmes outlining 
the EU’s agenda driving AFSJ policies and the timetables for their 
accomplishment. The first one was the Tampere Programme (October 
1999), adopted under the Finnish presidency, which endorsed a very 
ambitious plan corresponding with the high expectations about the 
possibilities offered by the Amsterdam Treaty. Along with the barriers 
encountered by the European Commission when translating the political 
ambitions into actual legal outputs, and as the contribution by Karl von 
Wogau outlines, the events of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004 
provoked a prioritisation of certain (internal and external) security 
initiatives (chiefly enshrined in the European security strategy). These 
focused on the so-called ‘fight against terrorism’, which in many respects 
overtook those falling under the umbrella of freedom and justice.  
The prevalence of the security rationale was directly reflected in the 
nature and priorities structuring the second-multiannual programme on an 
AFSJ – The Hague Programme (November 2004) adopted by the Dutch 
presidency. The Hague programme gave preference to the security of the 
Union and its member states, and understood the EU’s AFSJ as primarily 
driven by security (urgency-led) considerations and concerns. The Hague 
Programme also invented the metaphor of a ‘balance’ between freedom 
and security, calling for the need to strike the right balance between law 
enforcement purposes and safeguarding the fundamental rights of 
individuals. Overall, the political elements of the EU’s AFSJ agenda have 
been vulnerable to political demands for more ‘security cooperation’ within 
and outside Europe, perhaps without paying due consideration to the 
effects on and ethical implications of these very security policies for the 
liberal democratic principles, fundamental rights and liberties at the heart 
of the EU.  
In contrast with its predecessor, the Stockholm Programme – the 
third multiannual programme adopted by the Swedish presidency 
(December 2009) – no longer speaks of a ‘balance’ to be struck between THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 5 
liberty and security. As the contribution by Jacques Barrot demonstrates, it 
has rather placed a “Europe of rights” as the premise upon which any 
security measures need to be founded. As Barrot argues, the Stockholm 
Programme is the EU’s response to open questions about the ways in 
which people’s rights are respected (and empowered) and their security 
protected. Indeed, the Stockholm Programme departs from its predecessor 
(The Hague Programme) by stating that “[t]he challenge will be to ensure 
respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing 
security in Europe. It is of paramount importance that law enforcement 
measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law, 
[and] international protection rules go hand in hand in the same direction 
and are mutually reinforced.”1 
In light of the above, the two critical dilemmas for the future 
generation of the AFSJ are the following: First, how and to what extent will 
these new Treaty-based and policy elements be translated into practical 
and effective outputs? Second, how are the various interests and roles of 
the different actors going to be balanced under the new decision-making 
and institutional arrangements?  
The first immediate, visible result has been changes within the 
European Commission and the directorate-general responsible for AFSJ 
policies (the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security, DG 
JLS). One of the key proponents of a clearly formulated and specific set of 
powers for JHA in this field has been Berlin’s Senate Department for 
Justice, which has advocated an independent justice portfolio since 2007. 
As Hasso Lieber’s contribution highlights, this division is actually a 
European standard and “the balancing of interests by means of reciprocal 
control is part of the separation of powers that already exists in all of the 
member states”. As the AFSJ enters its second decade, it has finally 
achieved this. The Commission’s DG JLS is being divided into two parts – 
Commissioner Viviane Reding is taking charge of the justice portfolio 
(more specifically, justice, fundamental rights and citizenship) and 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström the home affairs one. This separation is 
critical to ensuring coherence between EU and member state governance 
structures and the effective implementation of regulations in both spheres. 
                                                      
1 See Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09, Brussels, 2 December 
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It will also permit a clearer focus on the application and embedding of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the core of both portfolios. 
Another result, which has somewhat surprised certain external 
commentators and actors not only  at the European Commission and 
Council, but also in non-EU countries such as the US, has been the effect of 
the enhanced position of the European Parliament as a co-legislator. The 
last ten years of European cooperation on AFSJ has taken place against a 
background of weak democratic accountability and scrutiny, where the 
European Parliament has too often been relegated to mere ‘consultation’ in 
areas having a deep impact on basic democratic principles and 
fundamental freedoms. A democratic deficit has also affected discussions 
on strategic agenda-setting, such as in the three multiannual programmes 
on an AFSJ (Tampere, The Hague and Stockholm), which have been 
exclusively in the hands of the European Council and with the exception of 
the Stockholm Programme have developed through non-transparent 
methods. As has been demonstrated by the European Parliament’s rejection 
of the SWIFT agreement between the EU and the US because of its effects 
on privacy and data protection, things are rather different after the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Emilio De Capitani’s chapter emphasises the importance of 
increasing democratic accountability for the EU’s AFSJ and its agencies. 
Efficient cooperation between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments and the establishment of inter-parliamentary oversight will be 
crucial. 
Various contributions to this volume have also highlighted the 
expanded role of national courts and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg as 
one of the most important innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
will have major implications for the oversight and interpretation of EU 
AFSJ law. The growing judicialisation that is expected in areas such as 
immigration, asylum, criminal justice or police cooperation will indeed 
constitute a positive central component in ensuring a more consistent and 
accurate application of EU AFSJ law, and in guaranteeing the protection 
and respect of the individual’s European freedoms and rights in all these 
policy domains.  
The substantive elements of the AFSJ: Borders, asylum, criminal 
justice and police cooperation 
The AFSJ is composed of a diverse and complex set of policy areas 
including, among others, issues related to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, police cooperation, immigration, asylum, borders and European THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 7 
citizenship. All of these areas have profound implications for the 
relationship between liberty and security in Europe, as well as for the 
fundamental rights of individuals. The compatibility of current and future 
proposals with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter the ‘EU 
Charter’) and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) will 
therefore be another topic of paramount importance for the future. A 
selection of domains in which more ‘progress’ (in terms of the level of 
policy convergence) has been achieved during the last ten years is the focus 
of several contributions to this collective volume, which we now turn to 
synthesise.  
Borders, privacy and data protection 
The last 25 years of European cooperation on border controls have been 
very dynamic and these efforts are now covered by the Integrated Border 
Management (IBM) strategy. The Amsterdam Treaty transferred part of the 
Schengen acquis to European competence. Since then, the EU has managed 
to develop a common corpus of legislation (the Schengen Borders Code) 
and to set up an EU agency coordinating border-control surveillance 
operations (Frontex). The challenge for the future will be the development 
of better strategies for ensuring the rule of law and fundamental rights in 
the practical application of these substantive institutional instruments of 
the IBM. This goes along with discussions concerning the increasing use of 
technology in border management activities. The EU has favoured the use 
of technological tools and databases, such as the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) (and the ongoing development of its second generation (SIS II) 
and the Visa Information System) and the new proposals envisaged by the 
European Commission’s 2008 border package, which have been subject to 
various concerns from different directions. As Peter Hobbing’s chapter 
points out, there are serious doubts about the “technological build-up” 
around border security, the mass processing of personal data and the 
capacity of such approaches to be workable solutions for their intended 
public goals. As Hobbing argues, the issue is not just the impact on privacy, 
but also the ever-greater “risk of data leakage, erroneous results and 
painful consequences for the individuals concerned”. The proportionality 
and efficacy of these approaches are questionable, especially in light of the 
economic repercussions of these kinds of technologies and their 
incapability of fulfilling the purposes they are meant to serve. 
Over the ten years since the AFSJ was created, there has been a 
veritable explosion of development in the field of information technology. 8 | THE EU’S AFSJ TEN YEARS ON 
What we are able to do now and indeed what we take for granted in terms 
of access to data on the Internet, the availability of information and its use 
was only barely within the dreams of a small number of experts a decade 
ago. While this extraordinary change in data availability has brought 
tremendous benefits to the EU, it also poses very serious issues for the 
present and future. The most important among these is the protection of 
privacy. This right, a core element of the EU Charter and the ECHR, has 
become a key feature of the constitutional framework of the EU. Yet, the 
mechanisms for protecting data about people individually and as groups 
have not kept pace with the development of technologies. All too often, EU 
regulation on data protection has accepted ‘exceptions’ to privacy rules on 
less than satisfactory grounds. Fears about political violence labelled as 
‘terrorism’ and the privileging of some claims in law enforcement circles 
have to some extent unseated the principle of equality of arms between the 
prosecution and defence. The EU needs to find better mechanisms to 
ensure that individuals’ data are not abused, shared with parties who are 
not entitled to it, only collected for legitimate reasons and subject to 
proportionality tests regarding retention. As the contribution by Joaquín 
Bayo Delgado underlines, in the next ten years the role of national courts in 
the EU data protection system will be central when redressing situations in 
which the result is an unacceptable infringement of the individual’s right to 
privacy.  
Asylum and fundamental rights 
All EU member states are signatories to the UN Convention relating to the 
status of refugees (the 1951 Geneva Convention) and have reaffirmed their 
utmost commitment to the protection of all persons at risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment in their country of origin. The inclusion of 
international protection in the AFSJ has brought a new actor, the EU, to the 
field of refugee protection. This arena is already well populated at the 
international level. Not only are there three UN Conventions that all 
member states have ratified and which place protection obligations on 
signatory states (the Geneva Convention, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention against Torture), there 
are also the institutional actors, including the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, responsible for a broad protection mandate. At the European 
regional level, the ECHR includes a duty of protection where there is a 
substantial risk that an individual would suffer torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment if sent to a country. The European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg has been vigilant in the protection of individuals from THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 9 
such risks. Into this crowded field the EU has now moved and taken its 
place. This step has not been without certain perils.  
For instance, one of the core measures of the EU’s Common European 
Asylum System is the Dublin II Regulation ((EC) No. 343/2003), which 
allocates responsibility for asylum applications and the care of the 
applicant according to specific rules that in practice usually means the 
country through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU is 
responsible. Because of the inadequacy of reception conditions in one 
member state (Greece), the constitutional courts of a number of other 
member states have halted any returns of asylum seekers there and the 
European Court of Human Rights has issued stays of return in numerous 
cases pending its examination of the situation. The EU needs to live up to 
its commitment to protect refugees and those in need of international 
protection. As the contribution by Madeline V. Garlick argues, the role of 
the Court of Justice in future decision-making on asylum after the Treaty of 
Lisbon could be crucial from this viewpoint. Any failure in this area will 
result in a serious problem for the legal coherence of the EU and deep 
damage to the EU’s reputation as an actor in the field. How the EU lives up 
to its commitments with respect to refugee protection will be an important 
measure of its human rights credentials. This point is highlighted in the 
contribution by Jacques Barrot, who adds that 
the founding values of the Union, and our shared history of 
tragedy and reconciliation, in my view compel us to extend the 
hand of hospitality and solidarity with those facing persecution 
around the world. This for me is one of the greatest challenges, on 
a truly global scale, facing the future of European integration. 
Cooperation in criminal justice and police 
One of the most surprising aspects of the AFSJ has been the rapidity with 
which the EU has embraced judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This 
field is ring-fenced by national interests and differences, which most 
observers ten years ago thought would hamper cooperation very seriously. 
Yet in fact, tremendously important steps have been taken. Eurojust, the 
EU’s body of prosecutors, has become not just a reality, but also a success 
far beyond the expectations of most observers ten years ago. As Hans G. 
Nilsson’s contribution argues, merely the volumes of cases that pass 
through Eurojust and the coordination meetings that it organises indicate 
the significance of its work in the EU criminal justice systems. With the 
Lisbon Treaty comes the possibility of a new actor on the criminal justice 10 | THE EU’S AFSJ TEN YEARS ON 
scene – the European Public Prosecutor (EPP). While this new post is only 
enabled by the Treaty, it offers a tantalising possibility of greater coherence 
and cooperation in the field. At the moment it is clear that there are 
member states that are deeply suspicious of an EPP. Still, the Lisbon Treaty 
does provide the opportunity to use enhanced cooperation to start the 
project and thus to allow those member states that see added value in the 
project to try it out. This may in turn create a virtuous dynamic, in which 
the more sceptical member states may invest more heavily in the success of 
Eurojust as an alternative – in the end leading to greater consistency and 
coherence in criminal justice across the EU. The next ten years of the AFSJ 
as regards criminal justice will be critical to the EU’s ability to work 
together and to provide a credible, joined-up criminal justice network if not 
system. 
The ambitious JHA programme on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and in particular the European arrest warrant has raised new 
questions for national constitutional courts about the meaning of 
constitutionalism and their duty to protect the citizen. As discussed in 
Kristine Kruma’s contribution, across the EU in member states that formed 
the EU in 1957 and some that joined in 2004, constitutional courts have 
been troubled by what has at times seemed a contradiction between their 
duty to maintain the highest standards of constitutional protection for 
citizens and to respect and obey the EU legal order. Constitutional courts 
are by their very nature actors of the Westphalian system – charged with a 
very specific role of protecting the individual against excessive incursions 
by state authorities within a strict jurisdictional framework. One of the 
most important subjects constitutional courts deal with is the state’s use of 
violence within the jurisdiction – the arrest, punishment and imprisonment 
of individuals. The EU’s embrace of the principle of mutual recognition as 
the mechanism to proceed in judicial cooperation in criminal matters has 
intensified the scrutiny some constitutional courts have given to the 
legitimacy of the EU’s involvement at all. The use of mutual recognition 
has brought attention to the procedural practices of member states and 
their capacity to ensure the rights of individuals are safeguarded, such as 
those envisaged in the EU Charter, the ECHR and national constitutions. 
The new Lisbon Treaty setting will put to the test the capacity of the EU’s 
courts to reinforce fundamental rights for individuals in the face of a state’s 
claim to legitimacy in its use of violence. 
The EU has entered the sphere of internal and external security as an 
important actor, although the definition of internal and external security 
remains a matter of deep uncertainty in an EU of 27 member states, each THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 11 
with its own understanding of the meaning of security. The Lisbon Treaty 
reinforces the role of all the EU institutions in security matters, a clear 
indication that the member states want a more coherent and transparent 
common approach. What remains unclear, however, are the kinds of 
actions and threats classified as internal security matters and in what 
context these are deemed internal. For instance, some member states have 
experienced internal security issues in the form of political violence. The 
continuing troubles in the Basque country are one example but are they an 
EU concern? Are they a concern of internal or external security? Among the 
issues that the EU institutions will need to examine are the relationships of 
various actions that have internal and external dimensions for the member 
states and for non-EU countries, including in the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy and interests and claims regarding security. The arrival of the 
European Parliament as an actor in this important field of activity owing to 
the Lisbon Treaty is already changing the dynamic of the EU’s security 
policies. 
During the last ten years, the EU has also been very active in setting 
up mechanisms and structures outside the framework of the Treaties and in 
areas at the heart of national sovereignty. As demonstrated in the chapter 
of Johannes Vos, police cooperation is an excellent example of that. The 
development of Europol and the adoption of the Prüm Treaty are two 
paradigmatic instances of European cooperation falling outside the EU 
legal framework but of an intergovernmental nature, which have only 
subsequently been (partly) transferred to the EU setting and envisaged by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. As Vos says, 1998–2008 was “the creative phase” in 
police cooperation, with Europol being its main institutional arm. In the 
last decade, a new set of EU agencies in the area of internal security has 
emerged, such as the CEPOL (European Police College), Sitcen (Joint 
Situation Centre), the Task Force of European Police Chiefs and now the 
COSI (Standing Committee on Internal Security). The exchange of 
information among them is presented as central in the power struggles at 
the EU level and the current European internal security strategy. All these 
agencies and proposals will need to live up to increasing democratic 
control and accountability (including on the quality of the data exchanged) 
by the European Parliament and national parliaments. They will also have 
to work within a more consolidated framework of fundamental human 
rights, with agencies such as the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) and the European Union Agency for the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) becoming prominent actors in future debates and activities. 12 | THE EU’S AFSJ TEN YEARS ON 
Conclusions 
The EU’s AFSJ constitutes the principal domain of the political elements of 
the European integration processes. It also plays a vital role in the added 
value and legitimacy of the EU for individuals (citizens and residents) in 
the Union as well as for ‘the outside world’ in a changing international 
context, in which EU AFSJ policies increasingly have external dimensions. 
This collective volume aims at contributing to the debates on the future 
configurations of the AFSJ. The experiences and views of practitioners and 
policy-makers are important to critical reflections on possible ways forward 
and to ensuring the relevance of any policy recommendation. The 
contributions in this volume offer unique input from this perspective. The 
Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme provide the institutional and 
political foundations for thinking about and proactively moving towards 
the next generation of the EU’s AFSJ. This generation should be capable of 
satisfactorily enabling progressive Europeanisation (matching ambitions 
with practical outputs) along with a new supranational setting that is 
characterised by stronger democratic accountability, judicial control, 
efficient evaluation mechanisms for the full application of the rule of law 
and an ambitious, fundamental human-rights strategy.  
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2.  THE EU’S AREA OF FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
 S UCCESSES OF THE LAST TEN YEARS 
AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
  JACQUES BARROT 
wenty years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked a new era of 
freedom and solidarity for Europe. Today, as well as being the 
world’s largest trading power with the second largest international 
currency and 500 million consumers, Europe is a place where people’s 
rights are respected and their security protected. It is often far from clear 
however, whether Europe’s citizens are fully aware of their rights and 
responsibilities, or whether they are fully empowered to exercise them. The 
Stockholm Programme is the EU’s response to these questions.  
There have been numerous successes to date. The extension of the 
Schengen area allows more than 400 million citizens to travel without 
border checks from the Iberian Peninsula to the Baltic States. Thanks to the 
establishment of Frontex, the Union’s external borders are better managed. 
A common policy on asylum and immigration is being developed on the 
basis of efficiency and fairness. Through the European arrest warrant and 
facilitating the exchange of information among law enforcement 
authorities, we have built up our capabilities for fighting crime, and in 
particular organised crime and terrorism. EU civil and commercial 
procedures now make it easier for citizens and businesses to gain access to 
justice where they have a cross-border claim. 
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More work is now needed if the Union is to meet the challenges of 
the years to come. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty enables us to 
demonstrate greater ambition in responding to the day-to-day concerns 
and aspirations of people in Europe. Meanwhile, a greater role for the 
European Parliament will make the EU more accountable for its actions in 
the interests of the citizen. 
The European Council sets out in the Stockholm Programme the 
priorities for meeting these challenges over the next five years. It is 
admittedly a dense document. Its contents reflect the discussions with 
member states, the European Parliament and stakeholders over the past 
year, but at its core are the ambitions the Commission outlined in its June 
2009 Communication.1 All in all, it amounts to a considerable mandate that 
will fall to Viviane Reding and Cecilia Malmström, the two commissioners 
who will take over from me and hold the reins of justice and home affairs 
(in a new era). 
First, the programme will promote fundamental rights  to help make 
European citizenship a tangible reality. The citizen’s initiative provided for 
in the Lisbon Treaty is a powerful boost for European citizens’ participation 
in the democratic life of the Union. Citizens should be able fully to exercise 
their rights to move to a member state other than their own in order to 
study or work, to set up a business, to start a family or to retire. With the 
increasing exchange of personal data, the Union must ensure that the right 
to privacy and principles of personal data protection are consistently 
applied. Attention must be given to the specific needs of vulnerable 
persons, particularly children and victims of crime. By acceding to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Union will both reaffirm – 
and bind itself legally to observing – its core values of respect for its 
citizens and their dignity. Once this happens, and it is my sincere hope that 
this will happen soon, European citizens who believe their rights to have 
been flouted will be able to bring their case before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. Freedoms and rights must also be protected 
beyond the EU’s borders and in virtual environments such as the Internet. 
The Council has pledged to support the creation of a European certification 
scheme for ‘privacy-aware‘ technologies, products and services. We will 
enhance consular protection so that any EU citizen who is in a country 
                                                      
1 See European Commission, Communication on an area of freedom, security and 
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where his or her member state is not represented can be sure of receiving 
his/her entitlements under the Treaties. 
Rights come with responsibilities. The Council has signalled its 
commitment to increasing turnouts at European Parliament elections, 
including the possibility of the whole of Europe going to the ballot box on 
the same day – perhaps 9 May, the anniversary of the Schumann 
Declaration. Action in this area is of critical importance to the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union.  
Safeguarding rights alone, however, is not enough. European citizens 
need to be empowered to invoke these rights wherever in the Union they 
happen to be. The second priority for the programme is therefore the 
development of a  Europe of law and justice. There are still differences in 
guarantees provided to victims and these must be addressed. In the case of 
the accused, a clear ‘roadmap’ for progress in ensuring their rights are 
observed regardless of the member state in which they are to be tried has 
been agreed during the Swedish presidency. Clearly, in matters of criminal 
justice, the harmonisation of offences and sanctions will take time. 
Nevertheless, one of the great advances of the Stockholm Programme is 
that it opens the door for Europe to work together on detention conditions 
in prisons. 
In the civil justice sphere, the cumbersome and costly exequatur 
process should gradually be consigned to history. Mutual understanding 
among professionals should be based on trust and the quality of justice, 
and the Union should work to eliminate barriers to the recognition of legal 
acts. We will continue work to increase access to justice through initiatives 
such as the e-Justice portal and greater use of video-conferencing 
technology.  
If we are to achieve a genuine community governed by the rule of 
law, we must first foster greater mutual trust among judicial authorities. 
Training has a vital role to play. The Commission has advocated an 
ambitious target of at least 50% of all judges and prosecutors to have 
participated in a European training scheme or an exchange with another 
member state by 2014. The Council has in principle endorsed this vision. 
The Stockholm Programme also sets the objective of evaluating national 
justice systems. Judicial cooperation will be enhanced, based on the role of 
Eurojust, which may well evolve into a European public prosecutor.  
Third, we envisage a Europe that protects. Globalisation means that the 
threats we face require concerted action at the European level. Our 
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trafficking, child pornography, cyber crime, financial crime and drug 
trafficking, respect no borders and must be met with common policies and 
common tools. The exchange of information among member states’ 
authorities on offences committed needs to become more efficient. We need 
a comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in cross-border cases. At an 
operational level, we need to remove the obstacles in the way of effective 
police action across borders. Europol will be given greater powers, and a 
network of police databases is envisaged. The programme moreover opens 
the way for a European internal security strategy, consisting of effective 
policies and common tools for addressing our common threats in order to 
protect lives and safeguard the freedom of our society. This strategy will 
bring together cooperation in law enforcement, border management, civil 
protection and disaster management along with criminal judicial 
cooperation with the aim of making Europe more secure. Finally, the 
Stockholm Programme looks ahead to the establishment of a European 
system of border guards to make our fight against trafficking networks and 
the human misery entailed more effective.  
Fourth, the programme looks towards a Europe of responsibility, 
solidarity and partnership in migration and asylum matters. Our population is 
ageing, and the  effective management of migratory flows is one of the 
greatest challenges facing the Union. Immigration has a valuable role to 
play in securing the EU’s strong economic performance over the longer 
term. In an approach to immigration and asylum based on solidarity, we 
will seek to tackle illegal immigration networks, ensure the successful 
integration of legal immigrants and honour our obligation to provide 
asylum to victims of persecution. Since my appointment as commissioner 
for justice, freedom and security in May 2008, I have fought passionately 
for such a common system to be achieved by 2012. The economic downturn 
and rises in unemployment inevitably make member states more cautious 
in these matters. The Commission was not able to convince the entire 
Council of the need for an immigration code and for applying the principle 
of mutual recognition of decisions to grant international protection. 
Nonetheless, the need for the improved integration of new arrivals, 
refugees and regular migrants remains. Immigration enriches European 
society and strengthens innovation in our economy. Meanwhile, the 
founding values of the Union, and our shared history of tragedy and 
reconciliation, in my view compel us to extend the hand of hospitality and 
solidarity to those facing persecution around the world. This for me is one 
of the greatest challenges, on a truly global scale, facing the future of 
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Finally, the programme highlights the role of Europe in a globalised 
world. A robust external dimension to our policies will ensure consistency 
with the Union’s foreign policy as a whole, and enable us to promote our 
values in compliance with international human-rights obligations. Effective 
engagement with our partners in non-EU countries and international 
organisations in the area of justice and home affairs will be essential. 
This is our blueprint for developing the European area of justice, 
freedom and security in the years to come. 18 | 
 
 
3.  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S NEW 
JUSTICE PORTFOLIO 
 O PPORTUNITIES, GOALS AND CHALLENGES 
HASSO LIEBER 
n September 2009, after long hesitation, the president of the European 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, finally agreed to split up the justice, 
freedom and security portfolio and create a separate portfolio for justice 
when the new European Commission convened in February 2010. 
Countless politicians, legal experts and lobbying groups had called for this 
step. With the nomination of Luxembourger Viviane Reding as 
commissioner for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, and the 
European Parliament’s confirmation of the new Commission on 9 February 
2010, the change is now complete. Berlin’s Senate Department for Justice 
had advocated an independent justice portfolio since mid-2007, and despite 
strong opposition, was energetic in pursuing this goal in many different 
discussions with policy-makers, scholars, judicial officers and 
administrators in Brussels and Berlin.  
Dramatic changes in EU justice policy  
By making justice a separate area of responsibility, the Commission is 
acknowledging this area’s increased importance. Once the smallest 
directorate-general, it has grown dramatically from about 90 employees to 
a staff of roughly 600. Comparing the multi-year Tampere Programme of 
1999 with the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European Council in 
December 2009, which sets out guidelines for justice and home affairs 
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through 2014, gives us a striking example of how this policy area has 
developed in the last ten years. 
Ten years ago, who would have thought that today we would be on 
the way to full harmonisation of consumer rights and have a justice 
commissioner whose long-term goal is to create a European civil code? Or 
that we would be discussing a legal instrument in criminal law enabling 
requests for the gathering of evidence in any member state to be processed 
under the mutual recognition principle? In other words, EU legal policy 
has undergone dramatic changes, and the Treaty of Lisbon will promote 
even more innovations, especially in criminal law, since a qualified 
majority vote of the Council is much easier to achieve than the unanimity 
of member states required by the Treaty of Nice.  
Balancing interests and ensuring transparent decision-making 
Stakeholders in the area of justice and home affairs often pursue opposing 
interests, especially when it comes to the conflicting priorities of security 
and freedom. One consequence of 9/11 was the marked preference given 
afterwards to security interests. A prime example of this orientation was 
the Commission’s 2007 proposal1 – which was ultimately rejected – of a 
framework decision on using airline passenger data for law enforcement 
purposes. In the interests of security and combating terrorism, the 
commissioner for justice, freedom and security responsible for this policy 
area at the time, Franco Frattini, advocated the precautionary retention of 
all such data for a period of 13 years. Passengers would have had very few 
rights to notification, information, correction or deletion of the data that 
had been collected.  
In the interest of a system of checks and balances, it was necessary to 
separate the Commission’s areas of justice and home affairs. “Que le pouvoir 
arrête le pouvoir”, and as the conflicts of interests discussed here make clear, 
Montesquieu’s core idea of the separation of powers can be applied not 
only to the state’s executive bodies but also to organisational issues within 
a single authority. The balancing of interests by means of reciprocal control 
is part of the separation of powers that already exists in all of the member 
states. The separation of justice and home affairs is the norm in 22 of the 27 
                                                      
1 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council framework decision on the use 
of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, COM(2007) 654 
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member states and can thus be considered the European standard, even 
though the areas included in each of the portfolios probably differ from one 
member state to another.  
The separation will now become the standard in the EU, since there 
are good reasons why it has become a traditional part of today’s 
governments. As we all know, political decision-making on basic issues 
and specific areas depends in large part on the point of view of the person 
making the decision. With that in mind, having two separate advocates at 
the highest level ensures a balanced approach to potentially explosive 
issues related to freedom and security. This promotes better decision-
making and is crucial to citizen acceptance of sovereign policies, since an 
active exchange of viewpoints brings the discussion of pros and cons to the 
attention of the public, enhancing visibility and transparency.  
Expectations of the justice commissioner  
a)  As might be anticipated, the newly established justice portfolio has 
overall responsibility for (almost) all legal policy issues. In particular, 
the draft directive on consumer rights that was the subject of 
impassioned debates in Council working groups and the Parliament 
has been transferred from the Directorate-General for Health and 
Consumers to the justice commissioner’s portfolio. In view of the 
draft’s profound potential impact on the civil codes of the individual 
member states, this change can only be considered a welcome step. 
Putting all legal policy issues in the hands of the justice commissioner 
will help to make legal instruments more coherent, an important 
goal. Against this backdrop, leaving the Directorate-General for 
Health and Consumers in charge of introducing class-action suits for 
consumers, a project currently in the planning stages, makes little 
sense; in the interest of coherent rules, the justice commissioner will 
need to work closely with the other directorate-general to coordinate 
content. Along with coherence, a key concern of EU legislation must 
be to balance various interests – one of the core tasks of a justice 
department in any democracy.  
b)  Past priorities are evident in the remarkable progress made in 
expanding on the mutual recognition principle in criminal law, with 
the aim of prosecuting criminals more effectively, while the 
establishment of uniform minimum protections for defendants in 
criminal cases is still at an early stage. There is reason to hope that 
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redress this balance, since it is essential that we set high standards for 
defendants’ rights after years in which legal security has been 
neglected in favour of domestic security.  
c)  With an independent focus on justice, data protection will no longer 
be regarded as just a security policy ‘appendage’. We can assume that 
the proposed framework decision discussed above (on setting up an 
EU-wide system to retain airline passenger data) would not have 
been submitted in its original form, which showed a blatant disregard 
for data protection, if the Commission had already had a separate 
justice commissioner. If the Commission is going to make a second 
attempt at a proposal on setting up a system of this kind, it will have 
to be coordinated with the justice commissioner. She will ensure its 
commitment to both procedural and substantive legal standards 
under the rule of law.  
d)  Implementing the Common Frame of Reference for contract law, 
which was submitted by European legal scholars in November 2009, 
will present another challenge. There is general agreement that 
political leaders should push for a meticulously formulated European 
contract law. Yet, the actual form it should take and its legal force are 
still unclear; the current point of view – at least according to the 
Stockholm Programme – is that it should serve only as a source of 
inspiration for EU legislation. This attitude may change in the near 
future: at the confirmation hearing held for Justice Commissioner 
Reding by the European Parliament, Ms Reding voiced very 
ambitious goals for European contract law and described the 
Common Frame of Reference for European contract law as the 
“embryo” of an EU civil code. That means we can anticipate an 
exciting debate with wide-ranging consequences for European legal 
culture. 
Outlook 
With the division of responsibilities between two separate commissioners 
for justice and home affairs, we have, however, achieved only an 
intermediate goal, although an important one.  
While the current organisational plan provides for separate 
leadership in the areas of justice and home affairs, the commissioners 
continue to share a single directorate-general. This structure is an obstacle 
to achieving the conflicting goals of justice and security; because of the 
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‘filtered out’ as they work their way through the department and never 
reach the justice commissioner. The areas of criminal justice and 
counterterrorism currently do not have their own advocates at the 
directors’ level – a situation that is not conducive to achieving a more 
transparent Europe, which involves a serious and credible commitment to 
protecting civil rights. As a result, it is essential that a separate directorate-
general for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship be created as soon as 
possible.  
Along with the Commission, the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
also needs to be reorganised. Here, too, justice has long been subordinate to 
domestic policy issues. The communitisation of the ‘third pillar’ and the 
accompanying disentangling of security and justice policy interests makes 
it possible to imagine future developments here as well: holding separate 
council meetings, as well as separate preparatory meetings at the staff and 
ambassadorial levels, would make home affairs less dominant and increase 
the transparency of what are often conflicting interests. In this respect, it 
would also appear that the time is ripe for the genuine emancipation of 
justice at the EU level. This will be successful only if the justice ministers of 
the member states are able to take up European legal issues independently 
in their own council. | 23 
 
 
4.  THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
THE EU’S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY 
AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON 
EMILIO DE CAPITANI 
Enhancing parliamentary oversight 
It is common knowledge that national parliaments are the ‘winners’ in the 
institutional reshaping of the EU’s decision-making process after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
The new chapter on democratic principles in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and particularly Art. 12, stresses that national parliaments 
shall “contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” by taking 
part in defining EU legislation and ensuring respect for the principle of 
subsidiarity in the matters of shared EU and member state competences. 
This indicates a strong willingness of all member states to increase 
democratic accountability in the continuing construction of the EU, as 
demanded by civil society and the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
1993 with the Maastricht Treaty and more recently in 2009 with the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
Seventeen years after the first declaration on national parliaments 
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, followed by the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam protocol in 1999, national parliaments can now play a stronger 
role, notably in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). These 
policies should be established and implemented ”with respect for 
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Member States” ( Art. 67(1), Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, TFEU). 
Consistent with this approach and with the need for national 
legislatures to maintain a strong role in the AFSJ, the Treaty has 
strengthened subsidiarity control and the ‘alert system’, as it can now be 
triggered by a quarter of the national chambers (instead of a third as 
foreseen in other EU policies). Moreover, national parliaments will also be 
associated with the European Parliament in the evaluation of AFSJ policies 
and their practical implementation, as well as the evaluation of the main 
EU agencies operating in this field, such as Europol and Eurojust (see Arts. 
70, 71, 85 and 88 TFEU). 
So far everything seems to be in place, at least at the level of the 
Treaties, to strengthen parliamentary oversight and specifically the 
contribution of national parliaments in developing the new phase of the 
AFSJ. Yet, the question remains of whether, in the real world, the principles 
will be truly realised. 
Looking at the experience of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE), possibly the committee most involved in 
establishing AFSJ policies, it is clear that some improvements are still 
needed to close the existing gap between theory and practice. Much more 
should be done at the European and national levels to strengthen 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament, in 
order for parliaments to have a stronger impact when defining and 
implementing EU legislation. 
In principle, the very idea of closer interparliamentary cooperation in 
the AFSJ, as foreseen in Art. 12(f) of the TEU, is shared by all the 
institutions involved and has been reiterated several times in recent years, 
not least at the “EU Speakers’ Conference” in Stockholm on 14-15 May 
2010.1  
                                                      
1 See the document, “Presidency Conclusions” from the meeting, 14-15 May 2010 
on the website of the Swedish Parliament (http://www.riksdagen.se/ 
upload/Dokument/utskotteunamnd/200910/Talmanskonferens-20100514/ 
EUSC_Presidency_Conclusions_final.pdf) and also “Background note: Evaluation 
and monitoring in the area of freedom, security and justice” on the same website 
(https://www.riksdagen.se/upload/Dokument/utskotteunamnd/200910/Talma
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The crucial point now is how to improve cooperation by taking stock 
of the experience we have had so far. 
Indeed, when looking at the comparable interaction between EU 
institutions and civil society representatives, or at the thousands of 
lobbyists who regularly follow the legislative work, the cumulative role of 
the 40 national chambers looks rather solitary and seems to be facing some 
difficulties in keeping up with the rhythm of the European decision-
making process. On a quantitative basis, hundreds of opinions of the 
national chambers have been adopted since the launch in 2006 of the 
parliamentary dialogue (the so-called ‘Barroso initiative’). Yet, many of 
them have not had a real impact on the procedure for several (and 
sometimes trivial) reasons, such as opinions being sent only to the 
Commission and not to the other institutions, or reaching EU legislators 
after a political agreement had been reached on the topic, or referring to a 
text that was already outdated. 
These shortcomings are frustrating, not least for the European 
Parliament, which is very keen on obtaining the positions of civil society 
and especially those of the national parliaments on the Commission and 
member states’ proposals. An appalling example of how important 
cooperation could be between the European Parliament and the external 
world is the 10-year saga on data protection. It is evident that it would have 
been impossible for the European Parliament to establish an alternative 
strategy to that of the Council and Commission without the support of 
information obtained on these issues by the European and national data 
protection authorities. Yet (and quite surprisingly), it proved nearly 
impossible to establish such a dialogue with the national parliaments, even 
though in many cases the same issues were debated at the national level.   
It is true that by adopting around 200-300 main documents per year, 
the EU institutions create a workload that is higher than that of a single 
member state in the same field. This can prove to be a real challenge for a 
national parliament that is (and obviously has to remain) mainly focused 
on national legislation.  
That being said, it is also true that the EU agenda is rather 
predictable, as are the different steps in the EU decision-making process. 
This allows for the possibility for a national chamber to easily limit the 
scope of its intervention to the approximately 30-40 legislative procedures 
and the 10-15 strategic documents that fall into the AFSJ domain. By doing 
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so, the rest of the workload could be shared with other national chambers 
and general issues could be dealt with in cooperation with other national 
parliaments. 
It is clear that in a given timeframe more or less all the national 
chambers are faced with the same challenges, be it during the ascending 
phase of the decision-making process and when Art. 12 of the TEU is at 
stake, or even more so when the implementation deadlines in the national 
legislation of an EU measure are approaching. In an era dominated by the 
concept of sharing information and mutual support, it should be relatively 
easy to build on the existing information tools, such as IPEX,2 as well as to 
create virtual spaces (for instance, an EU ‘Wiki-lex’ environment) where 
informal information could also be shared.  
Undoubtedly, a cooperative approach could be extremely helpful 
when new legislative objectives are taking shape in EU strategic planning. 
Strengthening the interparliamentary dialogue when AFSJ 
strategies are defined  
The starting point of dialogue between the European and the national 
parliaments could be when “strategic guidelines for legislative and 
operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice” are 
defined by the European Council (Art. 68 TFEU). Based on experiences so 
far, however, it is hard to say that the European Parliament or the national 
parliaments had the opportunity to interact in a fruitful manner or to 
influence the outcome of the European Council when it adopted the EU 
multiannual programmes in the AFSJ in 1999 (Tampere), 2004 (The Hague) 
or 2009 (Stockholm, ten days after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force). 
Moreover, the same applies when the anti-terrorism strategy (regularly 
updated since 2001), the European pact of asylum and migration (2008) or 
the EU drugs strategy were established. 
Even if in some cases the European Council’s deliberations were 
prepared by a Commission communication and these communications 
triggered the resolutions of some national chambers, it is not evident that 
the positions of national parliaments were taken into account by the 
European Council, as preparatory work is usually carried out under a 
rather blurred framework. Furthermore, it is not particularly reassuring 
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that the same frustrating experience has been shared by the European 
Parliament, which only found a clear reference to its own recommendations 
in some cases in 2004 and in 2009.3 For those who consider these European 
Council strategies to be so general and consensual that it would be better to 
focus more on the implementing legislative programmes established by the 
Commission, it has to be remembered that the Commission has always 
fiercely defended its right of initiative. By doing so the Commission has 
maintained planning proposals already rejected by the European 
Parliament (such as the one on an EU passenger name record system) or 
taken years before submitting new proposals formally required by the 
European Parliament under Art. 192 of the EC Treaty (currently Art. 225 
TFEU – see the request for a new legislative proposal on access to EU 
documents). 
This experience shows that much more should be done by the other 
institutions and by parliaments themselves to obtain a bolder role when 
strategy is defined in the AFSJ. Looking at it from the viewpoint of the 
European Parliament, the first objective should be to oblige the European 
Council and the Council of the European Union to make their preparatory 
work more transparent. The fact that Art. 10 of the European Council’s 
rules of procedure4 makes reference mutatis mutandis to the provisions 
concerning public access to Council documents (set out in Annex II to the 
Council’s rules of procedure) is very worrying. More specifically, the 
practice followed by the Council in the preparatory phase of its 
deliberations is highly unsatisfactory – be it when working in the legislative 
domains (only ministerial debates and votes that cover less than 10% of the 
institutions’ work have to be accessible following the Council’s 
interpretation of the new Treaty) or on strategic issues (where the Council 
considers that there is no transparency obligation).  
                                                      
3 In 2004, under the Dutch presidency a reference was made to the need to activate 
the TEU Art. 67 ‘passerelle’ bringing the co-decision procedure into several 
domains of the TEU Title IV. In 2009, a reference was made in the Stockholm 
Programme to the European Parliament’s recommendation on the future EU 
judicial area.  
4 See European Council, Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting its Rules of 
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The question is therefore how to overcome the current situation, 
which did not improve even after the landmark ruling by the European 
Court of Justice in the Turco case.5 
The key could be in the hands of the national parliaments, as it is 
more than likely that the lack of transparency in the preparatory work of 
the Council of the European Union (and European Council) is intended to 
notably protect the so-called ‘space to think’6 of the member states’ 
representatives. 
These member state representatives are also accountable before their 
national parliaments. Thus, the easiest way to break the current de facto 
conventio ad excludendum of the European and some national parliaments 
could be for the national parliaments to share among themselves and the 
European Parliament the information/preparatory texts of general interest 
(keeping away from documents that cover a specific national interest or are 
linked to the exclusive relations between a government and its own 
national parliament). 
Sharing, in real time, such preparatory information and texts would 
also be consistent with the spirit of the Treaties, which develop a consistent 
parliamentary oversight. This is particularly true for the AFSJ, where the 
Treaty itself requires that European and national parliaments be associated 
with the evaluation of AFSJ policies:  
Without prejudice to Articles 258, 259 and 260, the Council may, 
on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures laying down 
the arrangements whereby Member States, in collaboration with 
the Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the 
implementation of the Union policies referred to in this Title by 
Member States’ authorities, in particular in order to facilitate full 
application of the principle of mutual recognition. The European 
Parliament and national parliaments shall be informed of the content and 
results of the evaluation. (Art. 70 TFEU, emphasis added) 
 
                                                      
5 Refer to Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio 
Turco v. Council of the European Union. 
6 This expression covers the preparatory phase of Commission and Council 
decision-making as referred to in Art. 4 of Regulation No. 1049/01 on access to 
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Taking into consideration this very wording of Treaty, how can the 
evaluation of the current AFSJ policies be separated from parliamentary 
participation in the re-definition of the same policies, particularly when 
shortcomings are detected and require prior amendment to the existing 
legal and operational framework? 
This ‘interparliamentary’ oversight approach is further developed in 
the Treaties, especially by  
•  Art. 71, which grants national parliaments and the European 
Parliament the right to be informed of the activities of the Council 
committee in charge of the coordination of the action of member 
states’ competent authorities operating in the internal security 
domain; and 
•  Arts. 85 and 88 of the TFEU referring to parliamentary control of 
Eurojust and Europol respectively. 
Conclusions 
Bearing in mind all these aspects, in its recommendations of November 
2009 to the European Council on the Stockholm Programme, the European 
Parliament called 
for the creation of the evaluation system to give Parliament and 
national parliaments access to information related to the policies 
(Article 70 of the TFEU) and activities of the internal security 
committee (Article 71 of the TFEU) as well as of EUROPOL 
(Article 88 of the TFEU) and Eurojust (Article 85 of the TFEU), 
together with the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (Frontex), the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and the Schengen system; considers, in this 
framework, that Parliament should be granted the right to deliver 
a binding opinion on the appointment of the agencies’ directors (as 
Parliament is also the budgetary authority).7 
                                                      
7 See European Parliament, Resolution of 25 November 2009 on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
– An area of freedom security and justice serving the citizen – Stockholm 
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In addition, the European Parliament considered that  
in order to frame Parliament’s cooperation with national 
parliaments within the AFSJ, it would be worth creating a 
permanent forum of representatives at political level (two per 
Chamber + two substitutes) meeting twice a year and sharing a 
common workspace where all the information dealing with the 
AFSJ, including that of a restricted nature, could be shared in real 
time); considers also that the representatives of the national 
parliaments should be allowed to attend Parliament’s proceedings 
at committee level and during Parliament’s annual debate on the 
progress of the AFSJ.8 
So far, quite surprisingly, national parliaments have not reacted to 
these ambitious European Parliament proposals and even if they consider 
that the AFSJ policies remain a high priority for parliamentary cooperation, 
the concrete forms of the cooperation are still to be defined.  
Unfortunately, ten years after the Tampere Programme, we are still 
missing a common ‘space to think’ among parliaments in the EU. This is 
rather worrying when, for instance, after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, in five-year’s time the EU will be called to reshape the acquis of the 
former ‘third pillar’ and define its internal security strategy. Therefore, by 
acting alone the national parliaments risk missing the opportunity to shape 
future policies in this domain and the European Parliament itself will bear 
the responsibility of facing the Council, the Commission and even non-EU 
countries as was recently the case for the EU–US negotiations on the 
exchange of financial data (the so-called ‘SWIFT’ agreement). 
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5.  THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY 
AND JUSTICE AND THE ROLE OF 
NATIONAL COURTS IN THE EU DATA 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
JOAQUÍN BAYO DELGADO 
he national courts play several roles in the EU data protection system, 
which can be summarised as follows: 
a)  As national data protection rules apply to courts themselves, courts 
have a basic role of applying data protection legislation to their own 
activities.  
b)  Criminal courts have a specific role in controlling the police 
application of data protection rules, when the police act as judicial 
police, and the respect by public prosecution offices of data 
protection legislation. 
c)  With the existence of a supervisory authority being a crucial element 
of the European data protection system, national courts have the role 
of revising the decisions of the respective national supervisory 
authorities. 
First role 
We have to consider the legal instruments applicable to courts in the 
European context. The first instrument, of course, is Art. 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Although it refers to privacy, which 
does not coincide fully with data protection, it has to be remembered that 
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privacy is a key right within the various rights covered by data protection 
legislation. The second relevant European piece of legislation is the Council 
of Europe Convention 108. In principle, all its provisions are applicable to 
all national courts, unless a party has made use of the derogations foreseen 
in Art. 9.2, which concerns the provisions of Arts. 5, 6 and 8,1 or has under 
Art. 3 excluded certain areas from the scope of the Convention when 
ratifying it. France, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and the Netherlands have made 
use of such a possibility excluding some data pertinent to the areas of 
police and criminal justice.2  
One area deserves special attention: the transfers of data to non-party 
countries, subject to the idea of adequate protection. In Convention 108, the 
only transfers covered are those among parties of the Convention under the 
principle of equivalent protection, as all parties, by the very fact of being 
under the Convention, are regarded as having equivalent protection. The 
Additional Protocol (Convention 181) has regulated international transfers 
to third parties, under the requirement of adequate protection, as in 
Directive 95/46/EC. Unfortunately, this Additional Protocol has either not 
been signed or ratified by Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and the UK.3 
A third layer of legislation is comprised of the EU legal instruments 
and their transposition into national law. In this respect, the pre-Lisbon 
structure of pillars has produced two different legislative texts: Directive 
95/46/EC and Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. Superficially, 
it could seem that Directive 95/46/EC has no relevance for the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), as it is basically a first pillar 
instrument. Indeed, the first indent of its Art. 3.2 reads as follows: 
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: 
in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of 
the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing 
                                                      
1 Austria has two interpretative declarations on Art. 9. 
2 See these exclusions and the limitations mentioned above, on the Council of 
Europe’s website http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations. 
asp?NT=108&CV=1&NA=&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=FRE. 
3 This list was up to date as of 23 January 2010; see the Council of Europe’s website 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=181&CM=8&D
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operations concerning public security, defence, State security 
(including the economic well-being of the State when the 
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law.4 
Nevertheless, many EU member states have legislated to include 
police and criminal justice, completely or partially, in the scope of the 
national legislation implementing the Directive. The result has been that 
most provisions of Directive 95/46/EC are also incumbent upon police and 
criminal justice. At this point, it has to be regretted that terrorism and 
‘serious’ organised crime have sometimes been excluded, for example in 
Spain, even if they are in the scope of Convention 108 and the country has 
not used the exclusion possibility of its Art. 3. 
As to Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, after a lengthy procedure, 
progressively watering down the content and ambition of the original 
Commission proposal, the text as it stands now has a very limited scope as 
defined in its Art. 1.2 (namely exchanged data) and thus does not cover the 
so-called ‘domestic data’ (data collected in a member state and not received 
from others). Therefore, any other provision of the Framework Decision, 
unless expressly stated otherwise, has to be understood within this very 
limited scope. Additionally, member states have another provision that 
allows them to further limit the transposition of the Framework Decision, 
as it includes a fourth paragraph under the same Art. 1 as follows: “4. This 
Framework Decision is without prejudice to essential national security 
interests and specific intelligence activities in the field of national 
security.”5 
How far “essential national security” and “intelligence” can be 
stretched remains to be seen in the specific transposition by each member 
state. Let us hope that, on the contrary, member states are going to make 
use of the possibility foreseen in the fifth paragraph of this same Art. 1: “5. 
This Framework Decision shall not preclude Member States from 
 
                                                      
4 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281/31, 23.11.1995. 
5 See Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial 
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providing, for the protection of personal data collected or processed at 
national level, higher safeguards than those established in this Framework 
Decision.” 
While paragraph 4 makes it possible to broaden exclusions of data 
under the national legislation transposing the Framework Decision, 
paragraph 5 allows the application of data protection safeguards to areas 
not covered, thus including domestic data. But here we can have perverse 
effects. Let us imagine that a member state has applied Directive 95/46/EC 
to either police or criminal justice (or both) with no major exceptions as to 
the rights of individuals. As the level of protection set up in the Framework 
Decision is clearly lower than in the Directive (and unfortunately, than in 
Convention 108), including domestic data might mean reducing the level of 
data protection in the areas of police and criminal justice. On the other 
hand, if these areas are not covered by national legislation pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC or are covered by lower standards, the transposition of 
the Framework Decision to cover domestic data might produce a positive 
effect. 
Furthermore, terrorism cannot be considered to fall under the 
exceptions of “essential national security” or “intelligence” because most of 
the reasons to adopt European legislation in the areas of police and 
criminal justice cooperation relate to terrorism and organised crime. The 
Framework Decision is the necessary instrument to guarantee a minimum 
level of data protection in that context of exchange of data. If terrorism 
were excluded nationally, the main purpose of this framework decision 
would be undermined. 
With this legal panorama in mind, national courts, in both 
investigating crimes (in countries where the juge d’instruction exists) and in 
their proceedings and sentences have to respect privacy and other 
fundamental rights (the right of defence, non-discrimination, presumption 
of innocence, etc.) when applying criminal law. Higher courts have to 
review the application by lower courts as part of the legality they have to 
respect and guarantee. 
The Framework Decision has a specific provision reflecting the 
principle of independence of judges, which implies self-control on the part 
of the judicial system. The provision refers to the rights of rectification, 
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Article 4 Rectification, erasure and blocking 
4. When the personal data are contained in a judicial decision or 
record related to the issuance of a judicial decision, the 
rectification, erasure or blocking shall be carried out in accordance 
with national rules on judicial proceedings. 
Another provision has to be mentioned, as it fills the hole left by the 
lack of ratification of Convention 181 (see above) in the area of transfers to 
non-party countries, yet only partially, as onward transfers are covered but 
not transfers of domestically obtained data. Art. 13 regulates these onward 
transfers although not in a very satisfactory way, as it includes too many 
exceptions to the principle of adequate level of protection in the receiving 
country or international organisation. 
Finally, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA includes a provision that 
allows the transmission of data to private parties, for example in the 
defences of subjects concerned by the proceedings. Art. 14.1(c)(i) foresees 
“the performance of a task lawfully assigned” to the private party as 
legitimate grounds to give access to data. 
Second role 
Criminal courts, as noted earlier, have the role of making sure that in the 
investigation phase the data protection legislation has been respected. If 
not, rectifications have to be made, or if the breach affects the principles of 
the abovementioned Art. 8 ECHR or other fundamental provisions such as 
Art. 6 ECHR (due process), the nullity of proof can be envisaged.  
The legal panorama described above is basically the same to be 
applied to the police and the public prosecutor, given that from the EU 
perspective they are also included in the former third-pillar area. But the 
role of control of the judiciary needs a further nuance. Criminal courts can 
only supervise data protection aspects in the specific cases that reach the 
courts, not the general respect of data protection by police6 or prosecution 
authorities. Normally, the national supervisory authority will be competent 
to supervise the respect of data protection in the performance of such 
general activities of the police and public prosecution offices. This leads us 
to the third role of national courts. 
                                                      
6 Even a further distinctio n must be made for police, as in man y countries the 
police also play an administrative role, for example in issuing passports and 
national identity cards. In these cases, criminal courts have no competences. 36 | ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN THE EU DATA PROTECTION SYSTEM 
Third role 
The setting up of one or several supervisory authorities is the subject of 
Art. 25 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA: “1. Each Member State shall 
provide that one or more public authorities are responsible for advising 
and monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions 
adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Framework Decision. These 
authorities shall act with complete independence in exercising the 
functions entrusted to them.” 
The next paragraphs of Art. 25 establish the powers of such 
authorities. Note that these powers are parallel to the existing ones under 
Directive 95/46/EC, but member states may choose to set up different 
authorities for police or criminal justice, which vary from those already 
existing. Let us hope that this will not be the case, as it is important to have 
a global and horizontal approach to data protection in all areas. Remember 
that under the Framework Decision, the existence of a supervisory 
authority is not mandatory for domestic data (being out of its scope), so 
there is no EU constraint on having a data protection authority for criminal 
domestic data. Fortunately, countries that have ratified Council of Europe 
Additional Protocol 181, which includes this aspect, are obliged to have a 
supervisory authority. In practice, though, here the problem is not so 
critical as in the area of transfers to non-party countries, as the existing 
authorities under Directive 95/46/EC are usually competent in the AFSJ. 
So the courts become competent for appeals against decisions of the 
supervisory authorities. In this situation, it is not the criminal but the 
administrative7 branch of the judiciary that is the competent judicial 
authority to review the decisions taken by supervisory authorities.  
Both Directive 95/46/EC (in its Art. 22) and Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA (in its Art. 20) foresee a judicial remedy after the claim 
before the administration. Art. 17.3 of the latter includes a specific 
provision on the right of access. 
 
                                                      
7 This point applies whether the administrative branch is structured within the 
judiciary or as a parallel branch, as in the French or Belgian system. THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 37 
Looking ahead 
The Treaty of Lisbon itself does not change the roles of national courts or 
the legislation they have to apply to themselves and to other stakeholders 
in the AFSJ. But as Art. 16 of the Lisbon Treaty does not make any 
distinctions among pillars,8 domestic data in the AFSJ will have to be 
included in the revision of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, thus 
covering the entire scope of data processed by criminal courts, police and 
public prosecutors, even taking into account the specificities that 
Declarations 20 and 21 point out for the AFSJ. Therefore, the main 
recommendations for the future are as follows: 
1)  All EU member states should ratify Council of Europe Convention 
181. 
2)  Terrorism and organised crime should not be excluded, by any 
means, from the scope of transposition of Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. 
3)  The scope of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA must be enlarged 
to include domestic data. 
4)  Member states should not reduce their present levels of protection 
that apply to AFSJ matters in their transposition of Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
5)  On the contrary, they should use its Art. 1.5 to reach higher levels. 
6)  The rules on onward transfers under Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA should be modified to reach at least the levels of 
protection specified by Directive 95/46/EC. 
National courts should continue to apply data protection rules in all 
proceedings and investigations, taking coherent decisions with respect to 
any breaches committed, even by annulling proof when proportionate. 
                                                      
8 Art. 39 of the Treaty on European Union deals with the former second pillar, 
common foreign and security policy, which does not affect our analysis. 38 | 
 
 
6.  CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE 
LISBON TREATY 
THE FUTURE BASED ON MUTUAL TRUST 
KRISTINE KRUMA 
Introduction 
The snowball of Lisbon has started rolling. In February 2010, the 
constitutional courts (CCs) received a letter from the Belgian CC stating 
that the courts of other member states are invited to draw particular 
attention to a question referred by the Belgian Court to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling.1 The question referred is not linked 
to justice and home affairs (JHA) issues but concerns the exclusive 
competence of the CC to review the law for compatibility with the national 
constitution and the so-called ‘concurrence of fundamental rights’. One can 
expect more cases appearing given that the Lisbon Treaty (the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, TFEU) has brought significant changes in the JHA 
domain, which had been considered reserved to the state and the 
protection of its citizens. 
                                                      
1 See Case C-457/09, Claude Chartry v. Etat Belge, lodged on 23 November 2009. The 
Court’s representatives drew attention to several cases of the ECJ related to the 
judgement of 9 March 1978 in Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, for 
instance, the judgement of 27 June 1991 in Case C-348/89, Mecanarte [1991] ECR I-
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This can be regarded as a new starting point for clarifying the 
relationship between the CCs and the ECJ in the post-Lisbon era. The 
hypothesis discussed in this chapter is that the situation in relation to a 
Solange-type relationship between the CCs and the ECJ has changed, and 
enlargement has facilitated the process by bringing in new judicial 
institutions that might invoke the ECJ in a different legal–political context.  
As argued by de Witte, there are three challenges that the EU places 
before national constitutional systems.2 The first is the transfer of some law-
making to the EU level. The second concerns the direct effect on and 
primacy over conflicting national law, and the third is related to a 
reshuffling of the internal institutional balance within each member state.  
To prove the hypothesis, cases on the European arrest warrant (EAW) 
and national constitutional issues provoked by the Lisbon Treaty are 
analysed. The CCs of the Czech Republic,3 Germany and Poland, as well as 
the Supreme Court of Cyprus4 have reacted to the EAW, while the Czech,5 
Spanish,6 German,7 Latvian8 CCs and French Constitutional Council9 have 
                                                      
2 See B. de Witte, “The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions”, in C. Closa (ed.) 
The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions. Europeanisation and Democratic 
Implications, RECON Report No. 9, Arena Report No. 3/09, Arena, Oslo, 2009, pp. 
26-27. 
3 Refer to the Decree of the Czech Constitutional Court issued on 3 May 2006 (ref. 
Pl.US 66/04) stating the conformity of articles on the EAW with the local 
constitution. The key measure of the Czech legislation was the second sentence of 
Art. 14(4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, according to 
which the citizen cannot be forced to leave his/her homeland. 
4 In its decision of 7 November 2005 (ref. 294/2005), the Supreme Court of Cyprus 
asserted that the act implementing the EAW is inconsistent with the constitution 
because the latter includes an unconditional ban on the extradition of Cypriot 
citizens in Art. 11(2). A summary is available in English on the Eurowarrant.net 
website (http://www.eurowarrant.net). 
5 See Czech CC judgements Pl.US 19/08 of 26 November 2008 and Pl.US 29/09 of 3 
November 2009. 
6 Refer to Declaration 12/2004, DTC 1/2004, 13 December 2004. 
7 See judgement no. 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08 and 1022/08 and 1259/08 
and 182/09, 30 June 2009. 
8 See judgement no. 2008-35-01, 7 April 2009. 
9 Refer to Decision No. 2007-560 DC, 20 December 2007.  40 | CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE LISBON TREATY 
delivered rulings on either the Constitutional Treaty or Lisbon Treaty. The 
Czech Court has even been approached twice. The conclusions reflect on 
the Stockholm Programme and the problems envisaged.  
Transfer of competences 
Although the JHA domain has so far functioned on the basis of 
intergovernmental cooperation, the EU institutions have been active and 
have adopted instruments provoking reactions from the CCs or other 
highest courts in the member states. The implementation of the Stockholm 
Programme may give rise to an increase in such reactions. Thus, it is 
important to establish the red lines set by the various CCs. The first to 
mention have emerged from the EAW cases.  
The Spanish CC pronounced its view on the extradition of nationals 
even before the EAW had been adopted. It referred to Art. 7 of the Dublin 
Convention of 1996 and stated that “under no circumstances can the 
extradition of nationals to countries that have signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) give rise to general suspicions of 
failure to fulfil a state’s obligations to guarantee and safeguard its 
nationals’ constitutional rights”.10 The Czech  Court agreed with the 
Spanish position when approached by members of parliament. They 
claimed that the constitution prohibits citizens from being forced to leave 
their homeland and to be prosecuted for acts that are not defined as 
criminal in Czech Republic. The Court argued that surrender is limited in 
time for the purposes of criminal prosecution and that there is no doubt 
about the permanent relationship between a citizen and the state. Thus, the 
Czech Republic is merely assisting the other member state with the 
enforcement of that state’s criminal law.11 The Belgian Court decided to ask 
 
                                                      
10 See the Decision by the Constitutional Court, First Chamber, 27 March 2000, 
87/2000, Official Gazette 107, 4.5.2000 (http://codices.coe.int, ESP-2000-1-012). 
11 The surrender of a person to another EU member state for prosecution will be a 
matter for consideration only where the conduct constituting a criminal offence did 
not occur in the Czech Republic but in another member state. See 3 May 2006, 
Pl.US 66/04, Official Gazette 434/4006 (http://www.codices.coe.int, CZE-2006-2-
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for a preliminary ruling and the interpretation of the ECJ was reproduced 
in the Belgian decision.12 This quite open and liberal approach was not 
upheld by other CCs. 
Although not unanimously, the German CC dealing with the EAW 
concluded that it was the national law implementing the framework 
decision that infringed certain principles of the German Basic Law, such as 
proportionality and the guarantee of legal protection.13 The competence of 
the European Community was not disputed, since Germany has ratified the 
Nice Treaty and this has not led to a loss of the core elements of statehood. 
Still, the EAW encroached upon the freedom from extradition in a 
disproportionate manner. Thus, the interests of German citizens have not 
been taken into account.14 Similarly, the Polish Court in its ruling on the 
EAW noted that the obligation to implement framework decisions is a 
constitutional requirement.15 Nevertheless, this obligation might create 
conflicts with the national constitution. The Court went further than its 
German counterpart by declaring the EAW itself to be incompatible with 
the constitution, but deferred the time for the constitution to be amended 
by 18 months. These CCs showed bias and distrust in the proper 
application of the EAW in another EU member state compared with the 
Czech and Spanish Courts. 
                                                      
12 Yet another approach emerged when the Belgian Arbitration Court was 
approached by a non-profit-making association regarding the legality of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the EAW and the Court referred relevant 
questions to the ECJ rather than evaluate the constitutionality of the EAW by itself. 
See the Belgian Court of Arbitration, 13 June 2005, Official Gazette 124/2005, 
1.8.2005 (http://www.codices.coe.int, BEL-2005-2-011). For the response of the 
ECJ, see the judgement of 3 May 2007 in Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld 
VZW [2007] ECR I-3633. The CC reproduced paras. 45 to 60 of the ECJ judgement 
in its own decision. See Constitutional Court, 10 October 2007, Official Gazette 
128/2007, 24.10.2007 (http://www.codices.int, BEL-2007-3-008). 
13 See the judgement of the Second Senate of 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04.  
14 A number of dissenting opinions were attached to the judgement, some 
regretting that the Senate had refused to make a positive contribution to European 
solutions, and that by declaring the national act implementing the framework 
decision void, the Court was over-emphasising the role of citizenship and 
proportionality. See especially the dissenting opinions of Judges Lübbe-Wolff and 
Gerhardt. 
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Apart from the EAW there have been other cases dealt with by the 
CCs. For instance, the Hungarian Court has dealt with the case upon 
application of the president concerning an agreement between the EU and 
Iceland and Norway on surrender procedures.16 The Court found that a 
treaty provision precludes the executing state from determining whether 
the offence in question constitutes an offence under national law. 
Additionally, the double criminality provision was found to be contrary to 
Hungarian law. Separate and dissenting opinions were attached to the 
ruling appealing to mutual trust and confidence in other legal systems.  
Different CCs have dealt with the transfer of competences related to 
JHA in the context of the Lisbon Treaty. The Czech Court has dealt with the 
compatibility of Art. 83 TFEU with the constitution in two rulings. The 
same article has also been discussed by the German CC from the point of 
view of history, values and traditions. The German CC noted that the 
Lisbon Treaty considerably extends the EU’s competences in the area of 
administration of criminal law. Although both CCs were mindful of 
existing ECJ case law, the German CC observed that criminal law has 
always been a central duty of the state authority and is anchored in its 
values.17 The Czech Court placed emphasis on the present day realities of 
growing mobility and cooperation, which require trust among EU member 
states. The Court said it has no doubts about the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU in this regard.18  
The German and Czech CCs acknowledged that the integration of 
the state into the EU may require agreement to cooperate on matters with a 
cross-border dimension.19 The German CC noted, however, that the 
interpretation of this mandate would be strict and require particular 
justification. Moreover, a veto provided by the Lisbon Treaty might be 
                                                      
16 See Constitutional Court, 12 March 2008, 32/2008, Official Gazette 2008/40 
(http://www.codices.coe.int, HUN-2008-1-001).  
17 See note 7 supra, paras. 352 and 355. The German Court referred to the 
judgement of 13 September 2005 in Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council [2005] 
ECR I-7879. See also note 5 supra Pl.US 29/09, paras. 157–158. The reference was 
made to case C-176/03 and the judgement of 23 October 2007 in Case C-440/05, 
Commission v. Council [2007] ECR I-9097. 
18 See para. 155 of judgement Pl.US 29/09.  
19 See note 7 supra, para. 357. See also note 5 supra, Pl.US 19/08, para. 170 and Pl.US 
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invoked if fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system are affected.20 
The German Court placed an obligation on its representatives in the 
Council to ensure the adoption of only the minimum rules with regard to 
the definition of especially serious crimes with a cross-border element and 
sanctions only to the extent essential to ensure the effective implementation 
of a Union policy.21 In addition, German representatives will have to 
acquire a mandate from the German Bundestag, and if necessary the 
Bundesrat, to adopt decisions under Arts. 82(3), 83(3) and 86 TFEU.22  
The differences in approach of the CCs are multifaceted. The EAW 
can be considered a litmus test for mutual trust between the judiciaries of 
the member states and the ECJ. This issue will remain relevant in the 
context of both the Lisbon Treaty and implementation of the Stockholm 
Programme.  
Primacy of EU law 
The Lisbon Treaty has offered a possibility for CCs to take a fresh or even 
first look at their debates on primacy, how the EU is defined in this context 
and what the limits are to the primacy of EU law.  
The Czech and Latvian Courts have noted that the transfer of powers 
cannot go so far as to violate the very essence of the republic as a sovereign 
and democratic state governed by the rule of law and founded on respect 
for human rights.23 Yet both courts departed from the theory of ‘final say’ 
                                                      
20 See note 7 supra, para. 358.  
21 Ibid., paras. 361-362 and 364. 
22 Ibid., para. 365. 
23 See Pl.US 19/08, para. 97, note 8 supra and para. 18.2. Yet, the Czech Court noted 
that in cases Pl.US 19/08 and Pl.US 66/04, the Court had implicitly admitted that 
the CC should have an opportunity to examine European legal provisions in terms 
of their conformity with the constitutional order as a whole and not just with the 
essential core. In such a review it can then define those provisions of the 
constitutional order that cannot be interpreted consistently with the requirements 
of European law by using a domestic methodology, and which it would be 
necessary to amend. See Pl.US 29/09, para. 172. The Czech Court also refused to 
accept the president’s concept of sovereignty, which provided that sovereignty 
cannot be restricted or shared or to create a catalogue of non-transferrable powers. 
The Court considered these issues predominantly political, which should be 
decided by the legislature (refer to Pl.US 29/09 paras. 62, 109 and 111). 44 | CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE LISBON TREATY 
advocated by Germany and adhered to the approach of ‘initial say’. The 
initial say theory places emphasis on the aims, nature and structure of an 
organisation that is implementing competences. Thus, the transfer of 
certain competences to the EU must be regarded as an exercise of 
sovereignty of the people to reach the aims set forth in the EU instead of 
being considered a dilution of sovereignty.24 Both CCs noted that the 
transfer of certain state competences – arising from the free will of the 
sovereign state and which will continue to be exercised with the state’s 
participation in a manner that is agreed upon and subject to review – is not 
a conceptual weakening of sovereignty. On the contrary, it can lead to 
strengthening sovereignty within the joint actions of an integrated whole.25 
Particular emphasis was placed on the preservation of national identities 
along with political and constitutional self-government.26 According to the 
Spanish Court, these precepts, among others, confirm the guarantee of the 
existence of the states and their basic structures.  
Although issues concerning the protection of human rights were the 
main reason for the initial clashes between the ECJ and CCs, so far the 
Lisbon-related rulings have been quite limited based on the fact that the 
system will be changed. The Czech and Spanish CCs held that the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms falls in the area of the 
‘material core’ of the national constitutions. It was also admitted that at an 
abstract level it is difficult to evaluate whether the individual rights and 
freedoms ensured in these systems are in harmony with each other, if these 
rights are not formulated absolutely clearly and in detail.27 The Latvian CC 
noted that the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR, which would 
become binding for the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, are not incompatible 
with the constitution  because all the documents are based on the same 
values and principles.28  
                                                      
24 See note 8 supra, para. 18.3. The court was guided by Affaire du Vapeur 
‘Wimbledon’, CPJI série A, no. 1 15, 17 August 1923, 25. 
25 See note 5 supra, Pl.US 29/09, para. 147. 
26 Refer to Art. 4 of the Treaty on European Union, note 6 supra and note 8 supra, 
para. 16.3.  
27 See Pl.US 19/08, paras. 196-97. 
28 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stated that the objective of the legislator was 
not to contrast the norms of human rights established in the constitution with 
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The German CC observed that the state is neither a myth nor an end 
in itself but a historically grown and globally recognised form of 
organisation of a viable political community.29 Yet, freedom of legislature is 
not unlimited. Limits are set by the condition that the sovereign statehood 
of a constitutional state should be maintained on the basis of an integration 
programme according to the principle of conferral and the member states’ 
constitutional identity should be respected.30 The Court went further to 
define core concepts by including, inter alia, citizenship and the civil and 
the military monopoly on the use of force, above all as regards intensive 
encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in 
the administration of criminal law or placement in an institution.31 
According to the German Court, especially sensitive for the state are 
decisions on criminal law, the police and use of force in an interior 
context.32 In this respect, a transfer of sovereign powers beyond 
intergovernmental cooperation may only be realised under restrictive 
preconditions on harmonisation for certain cross-border circumstances.33 
The recent judgements show a considerable opening-up of certain 
CCs towards the EU. At the same time, this is not unconditional as one can 
read the importance attached to identity issues. Moreover, some CCs have 
defined the spheres that are of special importance from a constitutional 
perspective.  
New procedures and institutions 
The claims brought by Lisbon Treaty challengers to different CCs have 
contained arguments in relation to specific JHA instruments and 
institutions that might encroach upon sovereignty, including changes in 
decision-making procedures.  
For instance, a French decision established that provisions 
transferring to the EU under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ powers 
inherent in the exercise of national sovereignty require a revision of the 
                                                      
29 The Basic Law breaks with all forms of political Machiavellianism and with a 
rigid concept of sovereignty. See note 7, supra, paras. 219 and 223.  
30 See note 7, supra, para. 226.  
31 Ibid., para. 249. 
32 Ibid., para. 252.  
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constitution. The Constitutional Council specifically referred to the fight 
against terrorism and related activities, border control, trafficking in 
human beings and judicial cooperation on civil and criminal matters.34 The 
same principle also applies in relation to the prospective establishment of a 
European public prosecutor.35 Furthermore, the Council ordered 
constitutional amendments in relation to the possible option of an ordinary 
legislative procedure when deciding on certain aspects of family law, the 
introduction of a simplified revision procedure and the involvement of 
national parliaments.36 
The German CC criticised the Lisbon Treaty at length for a lack of 
democracy.37 The Court stated that the institutional recognition of member 
states’ parliaments cannot compensate for the deficit in the direct track of 
legitimisation of the European public authority that is based on the election 
of members of the European Parliament.38 
In contrast, the Latvian and Czech Courts adopted a more liberal 
approach by emphasising the increase in the role of national parliaments.39 
                                                      
34 Refer to para. 18 of Decision No. 2007-560 DC, 20 December 2007. The Council 
also affirmed its decision on the need to amend the constitution because of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is relevant in relation to articles of 
the Lisbon Treaty that are identical (para. 21).  
35 See para. 19 of Decision No. 2007-560 DC, 20 December 2007.  
36 Ibid., paras. 23-32.  
37 It should be noted that the German CC limited the scope of the review of the 
complaint (see paras. 168-206 of the ruling, note 7 supra). 
38 Ibid., para. 293.  
39 See note 8 supra, para. 18.4. The Czech Court commented that the position of 
national parliaments will increase, which is a good sign (Decision Pl.US 29/09, 
para. 135). To strengthen its reasoning on democracy, the Czech Court even quoted 
a passage from the Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro of 26 March 
2009, in Case C-411/06 Commission v. Parliament, para. 138. The first to be 
mentioned in this context is the public prosecutor (Art. 86(1) TFEU). In the first 
case before the Czech CC, the application of shared competences, subsidiarity and 
proportionality as well as the competence of the ECJ was disputed in relation to 
JHA. The Court overruled the claims, stating that for the time being it is satisfied 
with this institutional framework. See Pl.US 19.08, paras. 137-139. In contrast with 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, which expressly rules out the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ to evaluate the limits of the conferral of competences to the EU, the Czech 
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In relation to a simplified Treaty revision procedure under Art. 48 of the 
Treaty on European Union, the Czech Court commented that as yet there 
are no provisions in the legal order of the Czech Republic allowing 
implementation of such decision-making procedures. Nonetheless, the 
absence of procedures does not affect constitutionality and the Court will 
acquire competence to review only after procedures are adopted in a timely 
manner.40  
The Latvian CC was faced with the question on the role of a public 
prosecutor and noted that it is only a possibility and that the decision will 
be taken unanimously by the Council and with the consent of the European 
Parliament. Thus, Latvia will be able to block the decision if necessary. 
Moreover, even if a European public prosecutor’s office is formed, the 
national procedures will not be affected because the issues covered would 
relate only to the financial interests of the EU and to matters of cross-border 
importance.41  
Therefore, the CCs remain sensitive to the institutionalisation of JHA. 
While currently the courts remain open, much will depend on the 
implementation of the Stockholm Programme in terms of setting up new 
institutions and attaching new competences to them. 
Conclusions 
Rephrasing the views of de Witte as discussed in the introduction, it can be 
argued that CCs are facing a dilemma in the context of JHA. On the one 
hand, they are asked to show mutual trust and to open up to cooperation 
on JHA. On the other hand, CCs remain the main actors standing against 
the devaluation of national constitutions. Limited amendments to the texts 
of constitutions by state legislatures or people in referenda place an 
excessive burden on constitutional courts. In certain cases, constitutions 
have not been changed since the countries joined the EU. 
Although the logic behind the need for a strong JHA domain in the 
EU is evident from the perspective of the common market, several CCs 
have shown that they maintain a clear stance on protecting a Westphalian 
system, under which the protection of c i t i z e n s  i s  p e r c e i v e d  t o  b e  o f  
                                                      
40 See Pl.US 19/08, paras. 165-167.  
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paramount importance. This seems to be outdated taking into account EU 
integration and the fact that all member states are parties of the ECHR. 
The difference in views among the CCs shows that the role of the ECJ 
will remain central. Uncertainties caused by ambiguous formulations, wide 
discretion left to member states and unclear aims in the JHA domain can be 
settled by the ECJ in cooperation with the courts of member states. Mutual 
trust, as advocated all through the Stockholm Programme, should also be 
applicable in relation to the judiciary. This will become especially 
important given that national courts will have the possibility to refer 
preliminary rulings on JHA issues.  
Even if the Stockholm Programme concentrates on implementation 
and strengthening the existing arrangements, many of them may cause 
constitutional reactions. The establishment of agencies, groups and 
networks that may come up with different initiatives might have gone 
unnoticed by the CCs so far.42 In certain cases, problems could arise 
because the voice of a particular member state might not be heard owing to 
the changes in decision-making. Finally, crucial questions may arise 
concerning the consequences of de-pillarisation, the introduction of the 
‘Community method’ and adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
as exemplified in Belgium. 
                                                      
42 The CCs are usually acting post factum, i.e. when decisions have been made. 
Thus, at this stage CCs are not in a position to react on possible future decisions in 
the areas of extradition, the fight against terrorism, cooperation in civil matters, 
data protection or migration.  | 49 
 
 
7.  THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM 
SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE 
NEW JURISDICTION AND NEW CHALLENGES 
MADELINE V. GARLICK* 
Introduction 
In the area of asylum and refugee protection, the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam1 in 1999 represented a major political and legal step. 
The right to determine who enters and stays lawfully on state territory – 
including as a refugee or person otherwise recognised as being in need of 
protection – had traditionally been seen as a key element of state 
sovereignty. Asylum and refugee protection issues were among the most 
delicate and widely-debated political issues in many member states, 
notably following the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. By agreeing under 
Amsterdam to shift legal competence from the national level to the 
Community level, and to harmonise member state law and practice in this 
                                                      
* The author acknowledges the assistance of M., M.C. and P. Rechter in the 
preparation of this chapter.  
1 See the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and related acts (Amsterdam, 2 
October 1997), OJ C 340/1, 10.11.1997. The consolidated text of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
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sensitive area, member states thus entrusted control of an extremely 
important subject to their collective decision-making processes in the 
Council and to the EU institutions.  
The shift recognised the evolving context of the European Union’s 
legal order and physical reality, in which free movement policies and the 
progressive dismantling of border controls between member states meant 
that asylum seekers in the Union could also more freely cross national 
frontiers. Harmonising national asylum laws and policies was seen as a 
way to limit the phenomenon of ‘secondary movement’, under which 
asylum seekers were considered likely to move to the member state(s) 
where they could enjoy the most generous conditions and greatest chances 
of recognition and legal status.2 Harmonised laws and policies, according 
to this rationale, would reduce the incentive to move, and encourage 
asylum seekers to remain in the first state in which they had an 
opportunity to seek protection. 
                                                      
2 The UNHCR draws attention to the fact that asylum seekers move for different 
reasons, and not merely in search of favourable conditions. Yet, the prior and 
ongoing discrepancies among conditions, asylum systems and outcomes in the EU 
continue to pose significant questions about the results of the harmonisation 
process, and the fairness and efficacy of a system that places responsibility in a 
significant proportion of cases on external-border member states. See European 
Commission, Communication on a Policy Plan on Asylum – An Integrated 
Approach to Protection across the EU, COM(2008) 360, Brussels, 17 June 2008; see 
also UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR comments on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
member states by a third country national or a stateless person (“Dublin II”) (COM(2008) 
820, 3 December 2008) and the European Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment of 
‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [the Dublin II 
Regulation] (COM(2008) 825, 3 December 2008), UNHCR, Geneva, 18 March 2009 
(retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c0ca922.html); and 
also UN High Commissioner for Refugees, The Dublin II Regulation, A UNHCR 
Discussion Paper, UNHCR, Geneva, April 2006 (retrieved from 
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In the ten years since the decision to establish the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), the European Court of Justice3 has had the 
opportunity to date to contribute to the development of EU asylum law 
through only a limited number of cases. Following the Lisbon Treaty’s 
entry into force at the end of 2009, however, it would appear that the scope 
and impact of the Court’s activities in the field are likely to increase 
significantly in future.  
In committing to “establish progressively an area of freedom, security 
and justice” under Art. 61 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council agreed 
within five years to adopt “measures on asylum, in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 relating to the Status 
of Refugees and other relevant treaties”. These covered the following 
aspects: 
•  the criteria and mechanisms for attributing responsibility among the 
member states for determining an asylum claim; 
•  minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers;  
•  minimum standards with respect to the qualification of non-EU 
nationals as refugees; 
•  minimum standards on procedures for granting or withdrawing 
refugee status; 
•  minimum standards on temporary protection; and 
•  promoting a “balance of effort between Member States in receiving 
and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced 
persons”.4 
Along with all other areas under Title IV5 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the asylum provisions in Art. 63 were made subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. The Court was empowered by Art. 68 TEC6 to 
                                                      
3 The Court of Justice of the European Union comprises the European Court of 
Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. Among these, all cases 
relating to asylum have been referred to or heard by the European Court of Justice 
(referred to hereafter as ‘the Court’ unless otherwise stated).  
4 See Arts. 63(1) and 63(2) TEC, OJ C 321 E/1, 29.12.2006. 
5 Refer to Title IV: Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies related to Free 
Movement of Persons, TEC. 
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give preliminary rulings on the validity or interpretation of Community 
acts based on Title IV, on a question arising in a case pending before a court 
or tribunal “against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under 
national law”. This meant that the Court of Justice would be able to provide 
interpretive rulings on EU asylum legislation that would bind the member 
states – but only when asked by national courts of last instance, and not by 
courts at lower levels. (This limitation of preliminary reference power to 
final courts was seen as a means of ensuring that asylum cases would not 
flood the Court, given their prevalence in many judicial bodies at the 
national level.) 
With its explicit obligation to ensure that asylum measures would 
conform to the 1951 Convention,7 the Amsterdam Treaty forged an 
essential link between the EU’s legal order and the international legal 
framework for refugee protection. Its reference to “other relevant treaties” 
also incorporates by implication the provisions on asylum and non-
refoulement – prohibiting the removal of individuals to countries where they 
would face torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment – in 
the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT)8 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 as well as the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR). Although all EU member states individually are 
party to these instruments, the effect of Art. 63 TEC was to incorporate 
them explicitly into the EU’s asylum framework and protection obligations. 
The political significance of this move was emphasised by member states 
shortly after the Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force, when the Council 
met and adopted the Tampere conclusions. Those conclusions “reaffirm[ed] 
the importance the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect of 
the right to seek asylum”, and confirmed that it had “agreed to work 
towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the 
                                                      
7 See UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 137 (retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html). 
8 See Art. 3 of UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1465, p. 85 (retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html).  
9 Refer to Art. 7 of UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171 
(retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html). THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 53 
full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that 
nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-
refoulement”. 10 
This connection between Community law on asylum and the 
international protection system was further strengthened in Declaration 17 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, providing that “consultations shall be 
established with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
other relevant international organisations on matters relating to asylum 
policy”. This acknowledged the role of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the agency entrusted with 
supervisory responsibility in respect of the 1951 Convention,11 and further 
demonstrated the apparent commitment of the drafters of the Treaty to 
ensuring that the EU’s asylum rules would be developed and applied in 
line with international refugee law.  
Link between the European Court of Justice and asylum 
jurisprudence at the regional and international levels 
Through these specific references to international and regional sources of 
law on asylum and refugee protection, the Treaty framework ensured that 
the European Court of Justice assumed jurisdiction over EU asylum law 
against a background of important and well-established international and 
regional principles of refugee law. In addition to guiding texts such as 
conclusions of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee,12 these include a 
developed body of international and regional jurisprudence. The extensive 
                                                      
10  See Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere 
European Council of 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/1/99, Brussels, 16 October 1999, 
para. 13 (retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ef2d2264.html). 
11 According to its Statute, UNHCR fulfils its mandate inter alia by “[p]romoting 
the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection of 
refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments thereto” 
(Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 
December 1950, A/RES/428(V)). This supervisory responsibility is confirmed by 
Art. 35 of the 1951 Convention and Art. II of the 1967 Protocol.  
12 In Conclusion No. 25(XXXIII) 1982, the Executive Committee “[r]eaffirmed the 
importance of the basic principles of international protection and in particular the 
principle of non-refoulement, which was progressively acquiring the character of a 
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case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is 
particularly relevant to all EU member states, addresses many aspects of 
member states’ treatment of asylum seekers and other persons who may be 
at risk of persecution or serious harm if removed to other countries. Such 
sources are available to assist the Court in defining and interpreting the 
‘general principles of law’ that guide its decision-making processes, which 
include respect for fundamental rights.13 
This link between the Court’s jurisdiction over EU asylum law and 
existing developed case law is particularly well illustrated in relation to the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
Key ECtHR cases such as Soering14 established the principle that a 
state may not remove a person where there were substantial grounds for 
believing there would be a real risk of exposure to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving state. This prohibition 
on  refoulement  was found to apply even where s/he had committed a 
serious crime, or if his/her continued presence in the respondent state 
would be unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security, 
including in the context of the fight against terror.15 More recently, in Saadi 
v. Italy,16 the ECtHR affirmed the absolute nature of this prohibition. The 
ECtHR’s approach has been consistent with that of the UN Human Rights 
                                                      
13 As expressed in Art. 6(2) TEU, “[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law”. Within this framework, the European Court of 
Justice uses all treaties that the member states of the European Union have signed 
or participated in as interpretive tools for the content and scope of “fundamental 
rights”, while holding the European Convention on Human Rights as a document 
of “special significance”. (See Case C-4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491.) In 
the Kadi and Al Barakaat judgement of 3 September 2008 (Joined Cases C-402/05 P 
and C-415/05 P [2008] ECR I-06351), the Court affirmed that “[t]he Community 
judicature must…ensure the review…of the lawfulness of all Community acts in 
the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law” (para. 326). 
14 See Soering v. The United Kingdom (1/1989/161/217) [1989] 11 EHRR 439. 
15 See Chahal v. The United Kingdom (70/1995/576/662) [1996] 23 EHRR 413. 
16 See Saadi v. Italy (Appl. No. 37201/06), Council of Europe: European Court of 
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Committee in relation to the non-refoulement  obligation under Art. 7 
ICCPR,17 and of the Committee Against Torture regarding Art. 3 CAT.18 
Other asylum cases before the ECtHR have examined different 
aspects of asylum procedures and systems. In the case of Gebremedhin v. 
France, the ECtHR examined the nature of effective remedies, and 
concluded that states are precluded from removing a person who is 
awaiting a decision on appeal against a negative decision on his/her 
asylum claim.19 In Saadi v. UK, it ruled on the lawfulness of detention for 
asylum seekers, finding that administrative detention could be lawful 
provided it satisfied tests of necessity and proportionality.20 In SD v. Greece, 
it was concluded that poor conditions of asylum detention could constitute 
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Art. 3 of the ECHR. 21 
These decisions have thus established an important set of common 
principles, derived from a European regional instrument, which is binding 
on all EU member states in the application of their asylum law. This case 
law has taken on particular significance in the EU following the adoption of 
the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC), which employs the wording of 
Art. 3 ECHR in its criteria for the grant of subsidiary protection under Art. 
15(c).22 
It is interesting to note that at the time of writing, a series of cases was 
pending before the ECtHR regarding the risk of Art. 3 breaches through 
actual or proposed transfers from other member states to Greece under the 
Dublin II Regulation ((EC) No. 343/2003). Applicants alleged in a number 
                                                      
17 Refer to Human Rights Committee General Comment N. 20 (1992), paras. 2–3 
and 8, as quoted in E. Feller, V. Turk and F. Nicholson, Refugee Protection in 
International Law:  UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 145, para. 207. 
18 See Feller, Turk and Nicholson (2003), op. cit., footnote 167, p. 161. 
19 Refer to Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France (Appl. No. 25389/05), Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 10 October 2006. 
20 See Saadi v. The United Kingdom (13229/03) [2008] 47 EHRR 17. 
21 See S.D. v. Greece (Appl. No. 5341/07), Council of Europe: European Court of 
Human Rights, 11 June 2009. 
22 See Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of 
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of cases that transfers could result in their indirect refoulement from Greece 
to other countries where they would be at risk of persecution or serious 
harm, or of further removal to face persecution or serious harm, because of 
systemic weaknesses in Greece’s asylum system. In some other cases, it was 
alleged that conditions in Greece could of themselves amount to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, attracting responsibility under the non-refoulement 
principle.  
The fact that the ECtHR has become involved in adjudicating in what 
are reported, at the time of writing, as over 100 cases concerning 
application of the EU acquis is significant. Some observers have asked why 
these cases arose in Strasbourg and not in Luxembourg. One reason is 
likely to be the previous limits on national courts’ power to refer 
preliminary ruling requests to the Court of Justice. Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, Art. 68 TEC meant that only courts of last instance had such power. 
Asylum cases relating to Dublin II, however, by their nature were rarely 
able to come before the highest national courts. The limited information 
available to ‘Dublin’ applicants regarding their rights, combined with 
extremely short time limits to challenge transfer decisions and barriers to 
obtaining legal advice, collectively mean that challenges in Dublin cases are 
often not pursued at higher judicial levels. As such, this severely limits the 
scope for such questions – which raise critical issues of procedural fairness 
and affect thousands of people – to come before the Court. It is hoped that 
the Lisbon Treaty changes (as discussed below) will address this problem 
to a large extent. 
The first referrals to the Court of Justice on asylum  
Following the adoption of the first asylum instruments as required under 
Art. 63 TEC, member states began to apply the directly effective regulations 
on Dublin II and Eurodac, and to enact domestic legislation transposing the 
various directives into national law. As these instruments have 
progressively been utilised at the national level, the first preliminary ruling 
requests have been made to the Luxembourg Court concerning asylum 
questions.  
The first request, in the case of Petrosian,23 the Swedish (Migration) 
Court sought the guidance of the European Court of Justice on 
interpretation of time limits for transfer as defined under Dublin II. This 
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relatively technical decision was followed shortly thereafter by a ruling on 
a request from the Dutch Council of State in the case of Elgafaji.24 In that 
case,  the Dutch court had sought an interpretation of the concept of 
“indiscriminate violence” in Art. 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, 
providing for the grant of subsidiary protection to individuals threatened 
by such violence in situations of internal or international armed conflict. 
The Court found that the degree of individual targeting that had to be 
shown to establish an entitlement to protection varied according to the 
level and scope or widespread nature of the violence. It also established 
that the criteria for granting protection under Art. 15(c) were not the same 
as those for granting protection against removal established by Art. 3 of the 
ECHR, which was found to correspond rather with Art. 15(b) of the 
Qualification Directive.  
These rulings were significant as the Court’s first forays into the 
interpretation of Community asylum law in its new area of jurisdiction 
under Title IV. Yet, in three subsequent requests referred in 2008 and 2009, 
the Court received its first cases addressing concepts in the Qualification 
Directive that were based on specific 1951 Convention provisions. As such, 
these are the first cases in which the Court has been asked to interpret 
acquis asylum provisions derived explicitly from the primary international 
instrument on refugee law.  
The first of these, Abdulla and others v. Germany,25 was ruled upon by 
the Grand Chamber in March 2010. In its decision, the Court addressed the 
circumstances in which refugee status could be considered to have ceased, 
in line with Art. 11(1) of the Qualification Directive and Art. 1C(5) of the 
1951 Convention, including the relevance of claimed new threats of 
persecution or serious harm, and the standard of probability and burden of 
proof to be applied in such cases. The Court acknowledged in its 
judgement that the 1951 Convention “constitutes the cornerstone of the 
international legal regime for the protection of refugees”, and that the 
Directive’s provisions were adopted to “guide Member States in the 
application of that Convention”. It also specifically recognised that the 
Directive must be interpreted in light of its own general scheme and 
purpose, “while respecting the Geneva Convention and other relevant 
                                                      
24 See Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-00921.  
25 See Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla 
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treaties”, and in a manner that “respects the fundamental rights and 
principles recognised in particular by the Charter”.  
In these pronouncements, the Court appears to affirm its intention in 
construing the asylum acquis to pay close regard to relevant international 
legal instruments. In answering the questions of the German Federal 
Administrative Court, however, the Court also supported elements of the 
Qualification Directive provisions that are not based on the 1951 
Convention – finding among other things that international organisations 
may be able to provide protection against persecution, in a way that would 
justify the revocation of refugee status. This aspect of the Qualification 
Directive had been questioned by the UNHCR and others, including on the 
basis of international law. Its endorsement by the Court raises questions 
about the nature of the balance the Court will seek to achieve between 
acquis concepts and international obligations in future judgements. The 
direction of its future jurisprudence will thus be of great interest, bearing in 
mind also that the Court has in recent years affirmed that fundamental 
rights form an “integral part” of the general principles of Community law 
that it is bound to apply.26 
Further opportunities to examine these questions will arise in the 
cases of Bolbol v. Bevandorlasi es Allampolgarsagi Hivatal,27 referred by the 
Budapest Metropolitan Court as well as Germany v. B and Germany v. D and 
others28 from the German Federal Administrative Court, both seeking 
interpretations of other Qualification Directive articles. In Bolbol, the Court 
is asked to provide guidance on Art. 12(1) of the Qualification Directive, 
derived from Art. 1D of the 1951 Convention, relating to the entitlement of 
Palestinians to refugee protection. In Germany v. B, the Court will 
pronounce its view on the exclusion clauses of the Qualification Directive, 
which are similar – but not identical – to the related provisions in Art. 1F of 
the 1951 Convention.  
In all of the initial, preliminary reference cases above, with the 
exception of the Petrosian case on administrative time limits, the UNHCR 
                                                      
26 Refer to Kadi and Al Barakaat, footnote 14 above. 
27 See Case C-31/09 and the Advocate General’s Opinion of 4 March 2010. 
28 See Case C-57/09 and Case C-101/09 – preliminary reference requests published 
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has issued a statement in relation to the questions before the Court.29 Still, 
unlike in some other national and regional jurisdictions, including the 
ECtHR, the UNHCR has not participated as a formal third party to the 
proceedings. Under Art. 23 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice, 
only EU institutions and the member states are entitled to intervene in a 
preliminary ruling procedu r e .  U n l e s s  i t  t a k e s  p a r t  a s  a  p a r t y  i n  t h e  
proceedings before the national court, in countries where this is possible, 
the UNHCR thus lacks standing under the Statute enabling it formally to 
put its views to the Court to assist in its deliberations. While Declaration 17 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, requiring EU institutions to consult with the 
UNHCR, could be construed as extending to the Court, this has not been 
seen as the basis for a right to intervene as a third party to date. 
Given the importance of the questions under consideration for the 
future evolution of refugee protection and asylum law in the EU, the 
UNHCR has chosen to issue its statements on the preliminary reference 
questions in the form of public documents, available to all interested 
parties. In each of the cases heard so far, one of the parties has submitted 
the UNHCR’s statement as part of its official documentation provided to 
the Court, increasing the likelihood that the UNHCR’s opinion might 
contribute to informing the deliberations around the case.  
Consequences of the Lisbon Treaty  
Two of the many changes effected by the Lisbon Treaty are particularly 
significant for the Court’s future decision-making on asylum.  
The first of these is the expansion of the scope of the national courts 
empowered to request preliminary rulings. The Lisbon Treaty abolishes 
                                                      
29 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary 
Protection Under the EC Qualification Directive for People Threatened by 
Indiscriminate Violence, UNHCR, Geneva, January 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479df7472.html); see also UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statement on the “Ceased Circumstances” 
Clause of the EC Qualification Directive, UNHCR, Geneva, August 2008, (retrieved 
from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48a2f0782.html); and also UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statement on Art. 1F of the 1951 Convention, 
UNHCR, Geneva, July 2009 (retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/4a5de2992.html); and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR 
Revised Statement on Art. 1D of the 1951 Convention, UNHCR, Geneva, October 
2009 (retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4add79a82.html). 60 | COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
former Art. 68 TEC, which limited the right to request preliminary rulings 
to courts of last instance – meaning that all national courts, and not merely 
the highest judicial bodies, will be able to make requests in relation to 
asylum, immigration and visa issues. This has the potential greatly to 
increase the number of rulings that will be requested, but also to extend the 
range and subject matter of questions that will be put to the Court. 
Questions and provisions that may previously not have reached the highest 
courts can now be sent by the judicial tribunals and courts, which are 
dealing with the bulk of appeals or reviews of negative first-instance 
asylum decisions. This could be the case, for instance, with regard to 
Dublin II cases that until now have not been heard in the European Court 
of Justice because of the short timeframes and narrow appeal rights under 
most states’ Dublin II procedures, which may have prevented them 
reaching the highest level of domestic judicial structures. 
In March 2010, the first preliminary ruling request from a lower court 
came to the Court, from Luxembourg. This request, the first relating to the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC),30 deals with accelerated 
procedures and effective remedies – issues of great procedural importance 
for the operation of lower-level judicial bodies. This could indicate that the 
extended scope for preliminary reference requests will contribute 
beneficially to a more accurate and consistent application of basic asylum 
acquis rules at a practical level.  
The second major change is the conferral of legally binding effect on 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 18 of the Charter, providing 
that the right of asylum “shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules 
of the Geneva Convention”31 can consequently be invoked directly,32 not 
only before the Court of Justice, but also at the national level. It is not clear 
how the Court will interpret ‘right to asylum’ or the nature of this 
‘guarantee’, nor the interplay between this article and other provisions in 
                                                      
30 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ L 
326/13, 13.12.2005. 
31 Refer to Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/1, 18 
December 2000. 
32 See M.T. Gil-Bazo, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and the Right to be granted Asylum”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008, 
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the asylum acquis. Given that the Charter carries the same legal force as the 
Treaties, it should in principle prevail over any inconsistent provisions in 
an EU directive or implementing national law. This could potentially open 
the way for interesting and challenging legal arguments in a number of 
areas, including notably access to asylum procedures and to protection.  
Similarly, Art. 19 of the Charter, affirming the principle of non-
refoulement in terms of Art. 3 ECHR, will strengthen the application of this 
key principle. It could conceivably provide for interesting discussion in, for 
example, exclusion cases, where member states seek to invoke the 
exclusion provisions in Art. 17 of the Qualification Directive as grounds for 
denying subsidiary protection under Art. 15(b). The Charter’s unqualified 
non-refoulement obligation would appear to provide a strong argument in 
favour of protection for individuals who might otherwise be at risk of 
removal following rejection under Art. 17. 
Future of the AFSJ: The Court and asylum 
The Lisbon Treaty, with its expanded preliminary reference provisions and 
legal force for the Charter, has already opened a number of possibilities for 
the more comprehensive application of international refugee law in 
European proceedings. Still, there are several future developments or 
changes that could enhance the tools available to the Court to help it ensure 
full respect for the rights of those in need of protection.  
First, it is hoped that the Court’s jurisprudence in preliminary 
reference cases will draw extensively from refugee protection instruments 
at the international and regional levels, potentially drawing upon 
fundamental rights concepts from Community law more generally. The 
overriding Treaty obligation is for EU asylum instruments to comply with 
the 1951 Convention. Where EU secondary laws, such as directives or 
regulations, depart from the wording or object of the 1951 Convention, 
close scrutiny must be devoted to the issue of how those instruments can be 
reconciled with this Treaty requirement.  
Second, the role of the UNHCR in relation to court proceedings may 
be a subject for further reflection. Given the UNHCR’s supervisory 
responsibility with respect to the 1951 Convention, it has a direct interest 
and demonstrated expertise in the application of asylum law in the EU. Its 
previous inputs to domestic and regional courts as intervenor have 
demonstrated its ability to contribute constructively to court processes, 
including in relation to the ECHR, which on several occasions has explicitly 
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limitation on the UNHCR’s ability to intervene before the Court, based on 
Art. 23 of the Statute, may be something to be addressed in future33 for the 
purpose of a more comprehensive and informed legal debate. 
Finally, the Stockholm Programme puts forward a proposal that 
could positively influence the development of the EU’s asylum law, 
including through the courts. The Council in Stockholm stated that subject 
to a European Commission study, the EU “should seek accession to the 
1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol”.34 While the Amsterdam 
and Lisbon Treaties have already affirmed the EU’s obligation to respect 
the 1951 Convention, EU accession would have the benefit of establishing a 
direct link between the Union institutions and the international protection 
system, as well as strengthening institutional ties between the UNHCR and 
the EU. It would be welcomed by other state parties to the Convention as a 
step that confirms the EU’s commitment to refugee protection, and would 
increase the Union’s influence in discussions on the future development of 
international refugee law and policy. It also has the potential to enhance 
understanding of and respect for international protection norms 
throughout the courts of the member states. This could facilitate the Court’s 
task of ensuring compliance with the Convention at all levels of EU action 
on asylum. 
                                                      
33 There may be alternative ways to achieve this. For instance, the Court may able 
to take the initiative of calling the UNHCR as an expert witness or otherwise. 
34 Refer to Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open 
and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09, Brussels, 2 
December 2009,  p. 69 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/ 
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8.  THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EU’S 
EXTERNAL BORDERS 
 F ROM THE CUSTOMS UNION 
TO FRONTEX AND E-BORDERS 
PETER HOBBING 
Some history 
For an astonishingly long time, matters concerning the external borders of 
the Union remained in the close neighbourhood of criminal justice and 
policing within the now-obsolete intergovernmental pillar of the Union. 
This came as a surprise, especially to those with a more economic vision of 
the EU, who remembered the common border as part of the Customs 
Union of 1968 and thus the first flagship achievement of the young 
Economic Community.1 But, be it for security or sovereignty concerns as 
symbolised by traditionally uniformed border guards, no one dared touch 
this sacred security-oriented concept before the millennium and it was not 
until 2005 that the change to mainstream policy-making actually occurred.2  
                                                      
1 See P. Hobbing, Integrated Border Management at the EU Level, CEPS Working 
Document No. 227, CEPS, Brussels, August 2005, p. 5 (retrieved from 
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1254). 
2 Meanwhile, operational matters even nowadays (!) remain in the 
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Yet intergovernmentalism was not the only problem EU border 
management had to face in its early history. In contrast with individual 
countries such as the US, which has had a stable territory/borderline for 
the past 150 years or more, the EU stands out in the changes to its 
geography, involving new countries, new separation lines and new 
neighbours. The patchwork process continued after 1999 during the 
Tampere–Hague phase with ever-increasing speed: 12 new member states 
plus a few Schengen associates were added – each time entailing new 
geographical/administrative set-ups as well as inappropriate equipment 
and staff without adequate experience.3 
If at the tenth anniversary of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) the external border is not considered too problematic a 
construction site, even less its Achilles’ heel, this is owing to a few 
‘fortunate’ if ultimately logical developments. True, the Amsterdam Treaty 
with its Arts. 62 and 67 had already opened the door halfway to progress, 
but with sovereignty claims still going strong in national capitals one 
would not have expected the European Council to take the final decision in 
favour of the Community method at the earliest possible opportunity. 
The Tampere–Hague era  
Motors of change were of a mainly pragmatic nature. They included first 
the 9/11 effect, i.e. the recognition that transnational security threats could 
no longer be appropriately countered at the national level. And second, 
there was the (finally economic) argument advanced by the ‘heavyweights’ 
Germany and France that a non-operational external border would 
gradually undermine collective trust, lead to the reintroduction of internal 
controls and thus jeopardise the entire single market.4 
                                                      
3 For details, see P. Hobbing and R. Koslowski, The Tools Called to Support the 
‘Delivery’ of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Comparison of Border Security Systems in 
the EU and in the US, Brussels, PE 410.681, Ad hoc Briefing Note for the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament, February 2009, p.7 ff (retrieved from 
http://www.ceps.be/system/files/old/ToolsEP.pdf).  
4 See S. Bertozzi, Schengen: Achievements and Challenges in Managing an Area 
Encompassing 3.6 million km², CEPS Working Document No. 284, CEPS, Brussels, 
February 2008 (retrieved from http://www.ceps.eu/book/schengenachievements-
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As early as in December 2001, the Laeken European Council 
positively acknowledged the potential superiority of common management 
of the external border, by requesting the Council and Commission to devise 
cooperation arrangements and to examine the conditions in which a 
mechanism or common service to control external borders could be created. 
This dictum dealt a final, fatal blow to the absolute sovereignty over 
national borders as had been recognised as an iron law of statehood ever 
since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. 
In May 2002, the Commission further stirred up the debate with its 
Communication on integrated management of the external borders of the 
member states of the European Union, which culminated in suggesting the 
possible creation of a “European corps of border guards”.5 The allusion to 
supranational police forces once again revived old resentments against any 
Brussels-centred solution – but in the end rejection remained confined to 
this aspect while backing off on all other issues. 
As could be expected, the first generation of ‘mechanisms’ and 
‘common services’ created with pre-2005 tools (a common manual on 
checks at the external border and a common unit of external border 
practitioners) still proved too blunt to ensure coherent protection of the 
border, while the next stage implemented with Community means of 
action definitely showed more punch. Frontex, the European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
(operational since 2005) and the Community code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders (the so-called ‘Schengen Borders 
Code’ of 2006) thus became reliable cornerstones of the EU’s Integrated 
Border Management (IBM) system. In terms of parallel achievements, one 
should not overlook the EU framework of border-related IT systems, 
notably the Schengen Information System II to flag wanted/unwanted 
persons, the Visa Information System to support the common visa policy 
and Eurodac to identify asylum seekers on the basis of fingerprints. 
The EU’s approach in the international context 
While (when it comes to external borders) the US and other individual 
countries may build upon well-founded, monolithic state structures and 
                                                      
5 Refer to European Commission, Communication, Towards integrated 
management of the external borders of the member states of the European Union, 
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quasi-automatically deliver coherent responses, with its patchwork 
geography the EU still has to struggle hard to come close to such a result. 
In early 2010, there were 27 states/governments formally responsible for 
ensuring the protection of their respective segments of the 10,000 kms of 
land borders, 50,000 kms of sea borders and approximately 1,800 official 
border-crossing points. 
The current formula for resolving this complicated situation consists 
of the original 2002 elements of i) a common corpus of legislation (the 
Schengen border code6 and the Regulation (EC) No. 1931/2006 on local 
border traffic)7; ii) a coordination structure for operational action (Frontex); 
iii) a burden-sharing arrangement among member states more or less 
affected by the border (a Schengen facility and EU external borders fund); 
plus iv) a precise recipe for IBM, notably the need for close cooperation at 
all levels.8  
                                                      
6 See Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105/1, 
13.4.2006. 
7 See Regulation (EC) No. 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the 
external land borders of the member states and amending the provisions of the 
Schengen Convention, OJ L 29/3, 3.2.2007. 
8 More specifically, this would include the following aspects: 
•  border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Borders 
Code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence;  
•  detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with all 
competent law enforcement authorities; 
•  the four-tier access control model (measures in non-EU countries, cooperation 
with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area 
of free movement, including return); 
•  inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, 
police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international 
cooperation; and 
•  coordination and coherence of the activities of member states, institutions and 
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If the EU has thus succeeded in filling some crucial gaps in the 
external borderlines and increasingly takes credit for this in public, it has to 
do with the following most visible forms of intervention: 
•  state-of-the-art  upgrades to the technical infrastructure on the 
eastern and southern borders (mainly to border-crossing points and 
naval equipment) thanks to the Schengen facility (€961 million, 2004–
06) and the European external borders fund (€1.82 billion foreseen for 
2007–13);  
•  60+ joint operations against illegal immigration that have been 
carried out since 2006, chiefly along the maritime borders, each 
involving various member states or neighbouring countries and 
coordinated by Frontex. The interventions around the Canary Islands 
and southern Italy attracted critical attention for humanitarian 
reasons. In addition, a permanent maritime, European Patrols 
Network was set up in 2007; 
•  the creation of rapid border intervention teams (RABITs), based on a 
pool of border staff (RABITs pool) and equipment (Centralised 
Records of Available Technical Equipment or CRATE) to help 
member states at their request in cases of ‘exceptional and urgent 
situations’, such as a mass influx of illegal immigrants; 
•  logistical help for member states, such as risk analysis strategies 
(provided by Frontex); and 
•  the development of practical IBM handbooks as ‘export items’ for 
the Western Balkans (under the CARDS programme)9 and Central 
Asia (under the BOMCA programme).10 
Despite remarkable progress notably in the organisational field 
(Frontex and the IBM strategy), the EU lags behind because of the absence 
of certain routine features necessary to have full command over the 
borders. National segments still dominate the picture as a sort of a string of 
pearls loosely connected. The so-called ‘compulsory solidarity’ in the event 
of emergency situations still leaves some escape scenarios for unwilling 
member states, entry–exit movements across the border are covered by the 
IT systems in only a fragmentary fashion, and equipment and training 
                                                      
9 CARDS refers to Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation. 
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standards still largely diverge. Similarly, the EU has so far renounced 
introducing certain forms of air passenger surveillance such as the 
passenger name record or the electronic system for travel authorisation 
(ESTA). 
Post-2010 outlook 
The Commission’s border package of February 2008 marked a turning 
point in EU border strategies: be it through a curious glance over the fence 
at the US and other partners in the Western world or be it through the 
assumption that organisational measures had reached their limits, the new 
trend is clearly characterised by electronic and other technological features 
(‘e-borders’). 
Quite in contrast to previous years when the European Parliament 
and Commission fiercely quarrelled with the transatlantic partners over 
data protection and civil liberties, we now see a striking harmony of 
concepts. All that seemed of doubtful value before, such as fully automated 
border checks, comprehensive systems of entry–exit control, air passenger 
surveillance and electronic travel authorisation, hi-tech border installations 
including virtual fences, has all of a sudden become part of the EU’s vision 
for the 21st century. In more detail, the threefold package focuses on 
•  the ‘next steps in border management’, i.e. a combination of control 
and facilitation measures that – psychologically forceful – suggest to 
the traveller that s/he will gain on both aspects, security and comfort 
of travel. It includes i) privileges for ‘bona fide’ travellers thanks to 
biometric identifiers and automated gates; ii) a full-fledged entry–exit 
system allowing the border authorities to determine who is inside 
and who is outside the territory; and iii) ESTA, which following 
Australian and US models would require passengers to obtain an 
advance permit before they may board a plane (or possibly other 
means of transport) to Europe; 
•  the  future development of Frontex to allow the agency to obtain 
more independence in carrying out RABIT/CRATE interventions 
through the purchase of its own equipment, cooperating with 
international organisations and non-EU countries. Finally yet 
importantly, this aspect includes being able to exercise pressure on 
non-cooperative member states with the hint of the still-available 
option of a European corps of border guards; and 
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•  a future European border surveillance system (EUROSUR) to 
complement the seamless control at border-crossing points by an 
equally tight coverage of green/blue borders. Further details have 
not yet been established but it is understood that first the southern 
maritime borders are to be secured and later the land borders. 
Besides interlinking existing national systems, EUROSUR might also 
include the development of surveillance tools – such as unmanned air 
vehicles, earth observation technologies, border-related intelligence 
processes and a US-style ‘virtual fence’. 
Reactions were mixed, with applause for the improved organisational 
role of Frontex, yet with considerable doubts regarding the vast 
technological build-up proposed: it is true that the threats and challenges 
have become more complex, but technology does not present solutions for 
everything.  
There may be frustration about the slow progress in handling the 
border in a cooperative manner among the member states concerned, 
whereby technology is seen as a neutral way to ensure secure surveillance 
without the presence of ‘foreign’ staff on national territory. Technology also 
seems to offer tempting formulas to reconcile the permanent conflict 
between security and travel facilitation: the more you rely on 
automation/IT, the more you can reduce waiting queues at airports while 
making no concessions on maximum security standards. And finally there 
is an interesting promotional aspect for European industry: if Europe seeks 
to catch up with overseas competitors in security research by means of the 
€1.4 billion European Security Research Programme, why not take 
advantage of opportunities that open up right on the doorstep? 
While all this underpins the argument for more technology in border 
management, the majority of comments remain rather sceptical towards the 
breathtaking advance of hi-tech equipment and the mass processing of 
personal data in the form of a ‘digital tsunami’.11 N o t  o n l y  d o e s  s u c h  
collection and processing of data represent per se a far-reaching intrusion 
into privacy, but also quantity matters. The more data there is in the 
transfer patterns and profiling systems employed, the greater the risk of 
                                                      
11 Refer to E. Guild and S. Carrera, Towards the Next Phase of the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Commission’s Proposals for the Stockholm 
Programme, CEPS Policy Brief No. 196, CEPS, Brussels, August 2009, p. 7 (available 
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data leakage, erroneous results and painful consequences for the 
individuals concerned. The European data protection authorities constantly 
point to these risks. 
Likewise, we know from long-term US experience – as the world’s 
most authentic ‘testing laboratory’ for border security – that even 
enormous investments in advanced technology have not been able to 
render America’s borders watertight. Owing to the remaining loopholes 
and despite virtual and other fences, the famous entry–exit system is still 
not fully operational. US government experts openly recognise these 
difficulties, but curiously enough, over here no one seems to be taking note. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, this is not to discredit technical 
progress as such; but as with all long-term policy-making, such landmark 
decisions require profound reasoning and consideration. Fortunately, the 
EU has established formal procedures to prepare such decisions with 
sufficient care. Most of all, the Lisbon Treaty, with the full involvement of 
the European Parliament, should now ensure transparent discussions and 
due consideration of expertise, especially in data protection matters. In 
addition, discussions should not remain limited to issues of legal or ethical 
compatibility – in many instances problems start in the practical field. ‘Is 
the proposed concept likely to work?’ should be the first question.12 
Expensive strategies are not likely to produce a clear added value – 
e.g. an entry–exit system along the lines of the non-operational US model 
would not only mean a waste of public money but also violate the general 
principle of proportionality. Equally, IT systems that are not necessary as 
their purpose is already covered by existing instruments would be illegal, 
as they infringe the standard data protection criterion of 
suitability/proportionality.13 
                                                      
12 See D. Bigo and J. Jeandesboz,  Border Security, Technology and the Stockholm 
Programme, INEX Policy Brief No. 3, November 2009, p. 3 (retrieved from 
http://www.ceps.be/book/border-security-technology-and-stockholm-
programme). 
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Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is suggested that future border strategies should avoid a 
unilateral emphasis on technical solutions but pursue other promising and 
less risky tracks.  
One such measure could be the revision of the Schengen evaluation 
mechanism in the sense of more frequent and unannounced control visits:14 
less intergovernmentalism and more ‘federal’ responsibility would be the 
right signal to achieve a homogeneous implementation of the Schengen 
border code and thus a more coherent and secure border. Without 
monumental investments in border infrastructure or data systems, 
promising results may be obtained in numerous other ways, e.g. by taking 
advantage of the existing second-line controls in the workplace.15 
As a lesson to be retained for the forthcoming consolidation period of 
the AFSJ it seems most important that mutual trust among the member 
states (as well as between them and the institutions) represents the most 
precious element for the bon fonctionnement of the external border. 
Technology can replace this only to a limited degree. Despite all the 
difficulties and partial glitches, Frontex has managed to accumulate a 
considerable amount of confidence and goodwill among national 
authorities, to the extent that RABITs operations and other interventions 
from the central level are no longer met with suspicion, as was the case a 
couple of years ago. It may just be a small token of change, but a 
newspaper headline from somewhere in the north-eastern outskirts of 
Schengenland, “Foreign uniforms can now guard borders [with] Russia”, 
indicates a certain degree of normality. Such a change contrasts with 1999, 
yet appears even more remarkable if one remembers the TREVI16 times of 
                                                      
14 As currently proposed by European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the 
application of the Schengen acquis proposal COM(2009) 102 final, Brussels, 4 
March 2009. 
15 See Hobbing and Koslowski (2009), op. cit., p. 12. 
16 The intergovernmental working group TREVI (Terrorisme, radicalisme, extremisme 
et  violence  internationale) created in 1975 as a reaction against  expanding Euro-
terrorism (the RAF, Brigate Rosse), represented the first attempt to counter security 
threats through EU-wide cooperation. TREVI is seen as the forerunner of the third 
pillar under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, whose new organisational structures 
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the early 1990s when mutual trust was so low that Commission 
representatives had to leave the meeting room during “sensitive” 
discussions.17 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made in light of the above 
considerations: 
1)  The external borders require a high degree of efficiency and 
legitimacy, which can only be accomplished through a full 
communitarisation/Europeanisation of its management. 
Intergovernmental elements should be eliminated where still found, 
notably by an overhaul of the Frontex regulation. The exemption still 
granted to operational action should come under close scrutiny. 
2)  Rather than indiscriminately copying foreign models, the EU should 
carefully examine their appropriateness and adequacy for the 
European situation, which includes above all the testing of their 
practical efficiency. Systems unfit at home, such as the US entry–exit 
system, are not likely to work in Europe either. 
3)  The borders, as high-risk spots for human rights-related offences 
ranging from privacy to refugee rights, require appropriate 
mechanisms of democratic control, possibly in the form of a border 
monitor. 
4)  Frontex needs to redefine its IBM concept to include free movement, 
trade and customs aspects, and thus demonstrate the end of a 
unilateral focus on security. 
Technology has shown its limits elsewhere. One should not 
overestimate its benefits for the European context. Before investing in 
expensive new projects, one should first a) request evidence supporting the 
need for and efficiency of the systems proposed; and b) examine alternative 
mechanisms (e.g. second-line inland controls, revised Schengen evaluation 
rules, and greater independence of Frontex in logistical and staffing terms) 
for the extent to which they are likely to produce the same or even better 
results.
                                                      
17 As recalled by Adrian Fortescue, first director-general of the Directorate-General 
for Justice and Home Affairs (1999-2003), in a speech given at the 
Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden in November 1999. | 73 
 
 
9.  JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU 
 E UROJUST AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
  PROSECUTOR 
  HANS G. NILSSON 
he creation of Eurojust has always been intimately connected to the 
idea of the creation of a European public prosecutor (EPP),1 although 
it is probably true to say that Eurojust, as a judicial cooperation tool, 
had been in the minds of some persons since the beginning of the 1990s. 
This was a reaction to Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s ideas of Europol 
becoming a ‘European FBI’. 
In the middle of that decade, ideas on the creation of a European 
public prosecutor also began to take root, in particular in the context of the 
protection of the financial interests of the Community, where the 
Directorate-General for Budget at the Commission was a driving force. In 
the same context, magistrates in Europe began to protest against the way 
that mutual legal assistance was handled by political authorities, the most 
famous expression being the ‘Appel de Génève’.2 
                                                      
1 See H.G. Nilsson, “Eurojust: The Beginning or the End of the European Public 
Prosecutor?”, Europarättslig Tidskrift, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2000. For a general discussion of 
the EPP, see E. Ramos and V. Carbajosa (eds), The Future European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, Madrid: Imprenta Nacional del Boletin Oficial del Estado, 2009. 
2  See D. Robert, La Justice ou le Chaos, Paris: Stock, 1996. 
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But as with nearly all European projects, the idea of the EPP was way 
before its time – it had been forgotten that Europe practically never creates 
anything as a Big Bang – it has always been step by step, through practical 
cooperation and the advancement of ideas, through pilot projects and trial 
and error. 
Nevertheless, if one had said ten years ago that Eurojust would exist, 
that it would coordinate more than 1,000 cases per year and organise more 
than 100 coordination meetings, that it would coordinate serious and 
organised crime cases and terrorist investigations, most policy-makers, 
experts, professors – and also prosecutors – would have considered this 
unthinkable. Yet Eurojust exists, and it does precisely that. And it does it 
with success, as the growing confidence in the young unit shows. 
If one would have said ten years ago that the EPP or at least the 
possibility of it would now become a practical possibility and inserted into 
the Treaty of Lisbon, that also would have been unthinkable for most 
except the most optimistic (or unrealistic).3 Today, the fact is that the EPP is 
now in Art. 86 of the Treaty and that it is suddenly no longer utopia. 
Already this should be considered a great step. Even so, we are not there 
yet. And it would be wrong to think that it will be an easy path towards its 
establishment. On the contrary, and unless something dramatic occurs, it 
will still take several years, if not decades before we are there. Several steps 
will have to be fulfilled, each of them fraught with difficulties and delicate 
choices. 
What are the probable steps that will have to happen in the future 
before we will come to the stage of the European public prosecutor? The 
following is in my opinion the possible scenario for the future. 
First, the Eurojust Decision (2002/187/JHA)4 was recently amended 
through a Council Decision (2009/426/JHA)5 that brought the 
                                                      
3 In 1999, I noted that “people who started to speak about the European Monetary 
Union perhaps 20 or 40 years ago were at a similar stage as [those who] started the 
C o r p u s  J u r i s  p r o j e c t ”  ( s e e  H . G .  N i l s s o n ,  i n  B .  H u b e r  ( e d . ) ,  Das Corpus Juris als 
Grundlage eines Europäischen Strafrechts, Freiburg: Edition Iuscrim, 2000). 
4 See Council of the European Union, Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L 
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organisational structure, the handing-in of information to Eurojust, the 
tasks (read ‘powers’) and abilities to render the work more efficient more in 
line with the experiences so far in European judicial cooperation. A 
national coordination system was set up, thereby closing the gap between 
The Hague and capitals, linking capitals and judicial authorities with the 
case management system of Eurojust and creating real possibilities for 
seeing links between cases that could not be seen before. The obligation on 
member states to send information automatically in the most serious cases 
was considerably augmented and the organisational stability of Eurojust 
was strengthened so that it would not become a victim of national whims 
and uncertainties. Eurojust’s ability to work together with partners and 
non-EU countries was also strengthened, for instance by giving it the 
possibility to send liaison magistrates to non-EU countries. The College of 
Eurojust was additionally given the possibility to issue non-binding 
opinions in certain respects, such as when conflicts of jurisdiction arise. 
It seems clear that after this rather substantive overhaul of the 
Eurojust organisational set-up most member states would not be prepared 
to go into discussions on an EPP at this stage. They would rather be 
prepared to let Eurojust consolidate itself, implement the new provisions 
and let the national coordination systems settle themselves and find their 
role at the national and international levels. 
Second, after some time has elapsed (probably five years), member 
states would probably believe that it would be time to evaluate the impact 
and efficiency of the Decision. After such an evaluation, one could possibly 
consider whether changes could be made with a view to rendering the 
Eurojust set-up more efficient. 
The Lisbon Treaty points in two different directions, compared with 
the Amsterdam Treaty.  
Art. 85(1)(a) mentions as a “task” of Eurojust “the initiation of 
criminal investigations”, while at the same time Art. 85(2) indicates that 
“formal acts of judicial procedure shall be carried out by the competent 
national officials”.6 The question here is what is meant by “initiation”? The 
                                                                                                                                       
5 See Council of the European Union, Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 
on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA, OJ L 
138/14, 4.6.2009. 
6 Refer to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘Lisbon Treaty’), 
Consolidated version, OJ C 115/47, 9.5.2008. 76 | JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU 
term is not used in the Amsterdam Treaty, as amended by the Nice Treaty. 
As Eurojust already existed when the Nice Treaty entered into force, it 
should mean something more than what was already on the table. Eurojust, 
acting either through a national member or through the College, already 
had the ‘power’ to ask a national authority to initiate a criminal 
investigation. Therefore, the conclusion that I come to is that the task of 
“initiation” must mean that a national authority has an obligation to initiate 
the investigation in accordance with national law. Clearly, that will be a 
revolution in judicial circles in several member states, at least if this power 
is given to the College of Eurojust and not only to a national member. In 
the negotiations on the recent Eurojust Decision a number of member states 
even had constitutional difficulties in accepting that their own national 
members could act independently. It was as if the move to The Hague 
deprived them from all the judicial powers they had in their home 
countries. 
The other direction in which the Lisbon Treaty opens up further 
possibilities is in the “resolution” of conflicts of jurisdiction (see Art. 
85(1)(c)). This term did not figure in the Nice Treaty7 either, so it must 
mean something more and different from what Eurojust can do now. Is a 
written, non-binding opinion in a case enough? In my opinion it cannot be, 
given that if the national authorities do not agree or if their opinions differ, 
it would seem that no “resolution” has been found and a Eurojust “task” 
cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, it would appear that there is no other 
possibility than to make opinions from Eurojust (at least when acting as a 
College) mandatory for national authorities. Evidently, this would also be a 
revolution in many member states and may well (like the previous point) 
necessitate constitutional amendments in the member states. 
Third, I believe that we will have to make a real impact assessment, 
not only evaluating the functioning of Eurojust, but also particularly 
whether there is a need for an EPP in the light of how Eurojust works and 
how judicial cooperation in the protection of the financial interests of the 
Union works. Member states will not, at the present stage, be prepared to 
go through with what will be extremely complex and no doubt very 
lengthy discussions that will be required before an EPP can start to 
function, unless a real need has been demonstrated in an unambiguous 
manner.  
                                                      
7 The Nice Treaty instituted Eurojust into the Treaties. THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 77 
Therefore, the paradox is that the more successful Eurojust is, the less 
there will be a need for a European public prosecutor. And there is a 
double paradox: for the member states that do not want an EPP, they 
would have an interest in prioritising Eurojust as much as possible, which 
may include giving judicial powers to their national member in accordance 
with Art. 9 of the Eurojust Decision, for instance in all urgent cases or in 
relation to the joint investigation teams. Those member states that will 
support the EPP should also be able to support giving further powers to 
Eurojust, because this goes in the right direction for them, namely towards 
creating a European public prosecutor. Moreover, the success of Eurojust is 
also an objective shared by all member states. 
If we assume that the EPP will be set up, the two bodies will have to 
work side by side. How exactly that will be done will be a matter for the 
future, and it will not become one of the easier issues to discuss, but I 
would like to give some indications of own thoughts on the subject. 
As the Lisbon Treaty requires unanimity to establish the EPP, it 
seems clear that this will not be achievable in the near future if one were to 
aim at this option. Therefore, the only other option would appear to be to 
create the EPP through enhanced cooperation in accordance with the 
provisions of Art. 20 TEU and Arts. 326-334 TFEU, which would require 
that at least nine member states would be prepared, as a last resort, to set 
up the EPP (and subjugate themselves to its powers). 
It should be emphasised that the enhanced cooperation may only 
concern the EPP for the protection of the financial interests of the Union. 
The way the Lisbon Treaty is currently drafted would seem to mean that 
enhanced cooperation here cannot be adopted for the purpose of, for 
example, fighting organised crime or terrorism, unless the Council, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament and after consulting the 
Commission, unanimously decides to add competences (see Art. 86, para. 4). 
But this is only the beginning of the trials and tribulations for the nine 
member states that are willing to take this step. 
Setting aside any changes to their own constitutions (and it is highly 
likely that nearly all member states will have to do that) and the 
complicated procedures to achieve enhanced cooperation, the member 
states will also have to agree (according to Art. 86, para. 3) on the 
•  general rules applicable to the EPP’s office, 
•  conditions governing the performance of its functions, 
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•  rules of procedure governing the admissibility of evidence, and 
•  rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken 
by the EPP in the performance of its functions. 
Given the diversified nature of the codes of criminal procedure of all 
member states, also as regards those that originally adopted the 
Napoleonic Code, this seems to be a mammoth task. One needs only to 
think of the differences in our judicial institutions, the role of the 
prosecutor in the member states, the diverse functions and powers of 
investigating judges, and the various methods of organisation of the courts. 
These judicial institutions all have different powers and functions in the 
member states. Moreover, the issue of judicial review of the EPP will no 
doubt turn out to be difficult, and if one foresees using the Court of Justice 
for such a review, this may require a Treaty change. 
As the EPP, at least in the beginning, will be limited to the protection 
of the financial interests of the Union, Eurojust will remain in its present – 
or possibly changed – structure. The question then is following: How will 
the two bodies function together? 
The Lisbon Treaty provides that the EPP will be created from Eurojust 
(Art. 86, para. 1). What does this mean in reality? 
Many different solutions could be considered. The EPP could become 
a kind of 28th national member of Eurojust and sit in the College every time 
the protection of the financial interests of the Union is discussed. Only 
those national members of Eurojust representing the nine member states 
would be present. Another alternative would be that it is the College of 
Eurojust itself that would become the EPP, and within the national offices of 
Eurojust (current National Coordination System), one could in such a 
scenario also find the deputy EPP, who would represent the EPP at the 
national level. This could possibly be a national member or a deputy to a 
national member of Eurojust. Yet only time will tell if this is realistic. | 79 
 
 
10. POLICE COOPERATION ON AN EU-WIDE 
LEVEL 1998–2010 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
JOHANNES VOS 
Introduction 
It is a challenging task to explain in 3,000 words the successes and failures 
of police cooperation in the last ten years and the challenges in light of the 
Lisbon Treaty. My conclusion is that the successes are in a way remarkable 
(the creation of Europol and the adoption of the Prüm framework), while 
there are what could be qualified as deficiencies rather than failures (the 
start-up phase of Europol and the European Police College (CEPOL), 
implementation of the availability principle, and a lack of balance between 
security and data protection). The challenges ahead are in the areas of data 
protection, the better functioning of agencies, the role of different organs in 
the implementation of the internal security strategy, and the way the 
Commission and European Parliament assume new tasks and 
responsibilities. 
Police cooperation 1998–2008 
Bases 
Police cooperation started in 1975 under the TREVI framework, with 
special attention given to cooperation against terrorism. The Maastricht 
Treaty that entered into force on 1 November 1993 defined police 
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interest. Police cooperation was brought into the remit of the European 
Union. Decision-making was basically intergovernmental. 
The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and 
entered into force on 1 May 1999, contained more precise provisions on 
police cooperation. It extended the right of proposal to the Commission. 
Legal acts can take the form of common positions, framework decisions, 
decisions and conventions. 
The Schengen acquis was integrated into the framework of the 
European Union. 
During the period under review, work was also based on the 
Viennese action plan1 (adopted in December 1998), the conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council2 (15-16 October 1999) and The Hague 
Programme3 (adopted on 4-5 November 2004). 
The Viennese action plan focused on the development of Europol and 
the Convention that entered into force on 1 January 1999. Other measures 
were also mentioned, such as arrangements under which a law-
enforcement service from one member state could operate in the territory 
of another, and the development and expansion of operational cooperation. 
In the Tampere conclusions, besides the regular reference to Europol 
as a critical body to combat crime, the creation of a European chiefs task 
force and a European police college were foreseen. 
The impact of the 9/11 events was widely reflected in The Hague 
Programme. Strengthening security was an important element. Improving 
the exchange of information became a priority (the availability principle): 
throughout the Union a law enforcement officer in one member state who 
needed information to perform his/her duties was to be able to obtain this 
from another member state. The law enforcement agency in the other 
member state holding this information was to make it available for the 
                                                      
1 Refer to the Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Text adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 3 
December 1998, OJ C 19/1, 23.1.1999. 
2 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 
of 15-16 October, SN 200/1/99, Brussels, 1999. 
3 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 
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stated purpose, taking into account the requirement of ongoing 
investigations in that state. 
Police forces were invited to contribute to actions against the 
financing of terrorism, as well as actions against radicalisation and 
recruitment. Improving the security of the storage and transport of 
explosives as well as ensuring the traceability of industrial and chemical 
precursors were also recommended. 
Furthermore, the role of Europol was stressed, with more use to be 
made of joint investigative teams. Police cooperation among member states 
was to focus on specific themes and special areas (cross-border). 
Achievements 
Looking over the entire 1998–2008 period and taking into account the 
various aforementioned commitments, it is correct to say that many, if not 
most, of the tasks have been implemented. 
This may sound self-evident, but prominent theorists of international 
relations arguing that integration can only proceed primarily in sectors not 
at the core of the nation-state and with a key role for an institution such as 
the Commission might have problems explaining the creation of Europol in 
particular. 
Europol 
Europol has played an important role in police cooperation at the EU level. 
Its creation was suggested at the European Council in June 1991 in 
Luxembourg by the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. 
Experts are not yet sure whether his initiative was driven by a need to 
show his European commitment after the fall of the Berlin Wall or by a fear 
of rising international crime. Possibly both factors may have played a part. 
The Europol Convention4 entered into force in January 1999. Its 
mandate, originally limited to unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in 
nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, 
trafficking in human beings and motor vehicle crime, was progressively 
extended to cover all major forms of crime, including terrorism. 
                                                      
4 See the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
establishment of a European Police Office (‘Europol Convention’), OJ C 316/2, 
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Protocols adopted in November 20025 and November 20036 defined 
Europol’s involvement in joint investigation teams, strengthened Europol’s 
operational support function with respect to national police authorities and 
emphasised the important functions of Europol in the field of cross-border 
crime, investigation in support of Union-wide crime prevention, analysis 
and investigation. 
Prüm 
A major step forward in cross-border cooperation was the Treaty between 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria on the stepping up of the fight against cross-border crime and 
illegal migration signed in Prüm on 27 May 2005. 
In consultation with the European Commission, the substance of the 
provisions of this Treaty was submitted to the Council with the aim of 
incorporating them in the legal framework of the European Union. A 
previous text proposed by the Commission covering similar matters as 
those in the Prüm Treaty could not be agreed in the Council. 
The January–June 2007 German presidency played a crucial role in 
presenting and advancing work in the Council. The final Decision 
(2008/615/JHA) and an implementing text (2008/616/JHA) were adopted 
on 23 June 2008.7 8 
The objective of the Decision is to improve the exchange of 
information, whereby member states grant one another access rights to 
                                                      
5 See the Protocol amending the Convention on the establishment of a European 
Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and 
immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the 
employees of Europol, OJ C 312/2, 16.12.2002. 
6 See the Protocol Drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the 
Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), amending that 
Convention, OJ C 2/3, 6.1.2004. 
7 See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 
2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210/1, 6.8.2008. 
8 See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 
2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of 
cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
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their automated DNA analysis files, automated dactyloscopic identification 
systems and vehicle registration data. The principle of availability should 
b e  a p p l i e d .  C r o s s - b o r d e r  d a t a  c o m p a r i s o n  s h o u l d  o p e n  u p  a  n e w  
dimension in fighting crime, resulting in new investigative approaches for 
member states. The text also contains provisions for the supply of data in 
connection with major events with a cross-border dimension and the 
prevention of terrorist offences. Joint operations of designated officials in 
the context of maintaining public order and security and preventing 
criminal offences are also covered in the Decision. 
The Decision is a text with a wide scope, creating a central framework 
for operational police cooperation. More than in previous texts, attention is 
paid to data protection. As regards the processing of personal data, each 
member state shall at least guarantee a level of protection equal to that 
resulting from the pertinent Council of Europe texts of January 1981 and 
September 1987. 
CEPOL 
Pursuant to the conclusions of the European Council of Tampere of 1999, 
CEPOL was created in December 2000.9 It is a network bringing together 
national training institutes for senior police officers. CEPOL has its seat in 
Bramshill, UK. 
Among its main objectives are to increase knowledge of the national 
police systems and structures of other member states, of Europol and of 
cross-border police cooperation within the European Union; it also seeks to 
strengthen knowledge of international instruments, in particular those 
already existing at the European Union level in the field of cooperation on 
combating crime. 
Task Force of European Police Chiefs 
Pursuant to the conclusions of the Tampere European Council, a Task Force 
of the Chiefs of Police was established in 2000. It meets twice a year on a 
strategic level and also twice a year on a more operational level. It deals at a 
strategic level with more general issues not fully covered by other bodies.  
                                                      
9 See the Initiative of the Portuguese Republic with a view to the adoption of a 
Council Decision on the provisional establishment of the European Police College, 
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At the operational level, special attention is paid to projects under the 
initiative for Comprehensive, Operational, Strategic Planning for the Police 
(COSPOL), in which a group of member states in conjunction with the 
participation of Europol draws up an operational project in certain fields 
(e.g. synthetic drugs, cocaine and the trafficking of human beings) under 
the aegis of a lead country. 
Other matters 
Since 1998, the Council has adopted soft law (i.e. resolutions and 
conclusions) on the protection of public figures and security at football 
games. Council bodies have additionally dealt with relations with the 
Union, especially Europol and the South-East European Cooperation 
Initiative. 
Cooperation between EU police forces and Europol, for example in 
Kosovo as regards data collection and analysis of organised crime, has also 
drawn the attention of the Council.  
Assessment 
Looking at the commitments in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties 
along with the Vienna, Tampere and Hague action plans/programmes, it 
can be concluded that to a large extent missions have been accomplished. 
All the frameworks are in place: Europol, CEPOL and the Prüm Decision. 
Insufficiencies in the decision-making process that have been stressed 
regularly (unanimity and the lack of European Parliament involvement) do 
not seem to have hampered progress. A well-planned, well-coordinated 
initiative of a key delegation can have a decisive impact.  
This was the case in July 1994 as regards the Europol Convention and 
in January 2007 with respect to the Prüm Decision. Both initiatives were 
presented and successfully carried forward by the German ministry of 
interior in the context of the German presidency.  
Agencies such as Europol and CEPOL have had starting problems. In 
this respect, the delay in the full operational phase of the Europol 
Information System was regrettable. More and more cases are being 
initiated by Europol (from 1,919 in 2000 to 8,377 in 2008). 
Europol has a major role in the drawing up the Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment report (OCTA and ROCTA on Russia). Its budget rose 
from €28 million in 2000 to €64 million in 2008. There were 622 persons 
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agreements were in place with seven countries, Eurojust and Interpol. 
Strategic agreements were in place with seven countries and eight 
organisations. 
It is too early to assess the implementation of the Prüm Decision. 
The Task Force of the Chiefs of Police has been looking for its role 
apart from Europol and Council structures. COSPOL projects were not 
always successful and the meetings at strategic level were ever less 
attended by the heads of police. 
Over the course of time, increasing attention – although not enough 
according to many observers – has been paid to data protection. 
Looking back, the 1998–2008 period may have been a crucial stage in 
EU-wide police cooperation. Important instruments and bodies were put in 
place. It was the creative phase. 
Lisbon Treaty/Stockholm Programme 
Lisbon Treaty10 
In establishing a space of freedom, justice and security, the Commission 
and European Parliament saw their roles expanded by the Lisbon Treaty. 
A shared right of proposal for the Commission, qualified majority 
and co-decision by the European Parliament applies to the following areas: 
•  the collection, storage, processing/analysis and exchange of relevant 
information; 
•  support for training and cooperation on the exchange of staff, on 
equipment and on research into crime detection; and 
•  common investigative techniques in relation to the detection of 
serious forms of organised crime. Operational cooperation will be 
decided by the Council unanimously after consultation with the 
European Parliament. A special procedure is foreseen for 
strengthened cooperation among a limited number of member states.  
Only a quarter of the member states have the right of initiative. 
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A single article (Art. 88) is devoted to Europol. Its provisions have 
already been largely incorporated in the Council decision establishing the 
European Police Office. That was adopted in 2008 and will apply from 1 
January 2010.11 Europol will be an entity of the European Union, funded 
from the general budget of the European Communities. The responsibilities 
of the European Parliament in the control of Europol will be enhanced. 
Europol can now assist the competent authorities, the member states, 
without the limitation that there must be factual indication that an 
organised criminal structure is involved. Participation in joint investigative 
teams is being facilitated. The position of a data protection officer has been 
created. 
The Lisbon Treaty itself provides that through the co-decision 
procedure, the operation, fields of action and tasks of Europol shall be 
agreed. The same procedure applies to control of Europol by the European 
Parliament and national parliaments. 
Stockholm Programme12 
As The Hague Programme came to its term and with the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty being imminent, at its meeting of December 2009 the 
European Council adopted the Stockholm Programme, with the 
subheading “An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the 
citizens”. 
The major focus of this programme is migration/asylum. As regards 
police cooperation, reference is made to the definition of a comprehensive, 
internal security strategy. 
Among its principles are stringent cooperation among EU agencies, 
including further improving information exchange and the use of regional 
initiatives and regional cooperation. 
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12 See Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and 
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The Internal Security Committee, set up under Art. 71 of the Lisbon 
Treaty to promote and strengthen operational cooperation, is tasked with 
monitoring, developing and implementing the internal security strategy. 
Managing the flow of information with particular attention to an 
appropriate data protection regime is a priority. The forthcoming 
information strategy should be driven by law enforcement needs and aim 
at the interoperability of IT systems. 
The key role of Europol is confirmed providing that it should become 
a hub for information exchange among the law enforcement authorities of 
the member states, a service provider and a platform for law enforcement 
services. Joint investigative teams should be used more often as a tool. 
Europol has to work more closely with the police missions that take place 
under the European security and defence policy. 
Moreover, the Commission, and where appropriate the Council and 
high representative, are invited to 
•  examine how Europol’s receipt of information from member states 
could be ensured and how operational cooperation could be stepped 
up, e.g. as regards the incompatibility of information systems and 
other equipment, and the use of undercover agents; 
•  consider developing a police cooperation code for consolidating 
existing instruments, and where necessary amend and simplify them; 
and 
•  promote operational agreements among the EU agencies and their 
participation in regional initiatives. 
Pilot projects in cross-border regional cooperation such as the Joint 
Police and Customs Centres should be promoted. 
Follow-up 
In the light of and pursuant to the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty/Stockholm Programme, various initiatives have been developed. A 
proposal for an information management strategy for EU internal security 
was adopted in December 2009. An internal security strategy was agreed 
by the Council in February 2010.13 The Standing Committee on Internal 
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Security (COSI) had its first meeting on 11 March 2010. In addition, a JHA 
trio-presidency programme was presented on 4 January 201014 reflecting 
the commitments of the Stockholm Programme. 
Challenges 
Looking back over the last ten years, it is nearly impossible to speak about 
failures. There have been insufficiencies that have been coped with (e.g. 
through new Europol texts and the Prüm Decision). Institutional flexibility, 
considered by some a weakness, may have been behind some major 
successes (e.g. advanced under the German presidencies in 1994 and 2007). 
The provision that a quarter of the member states can present an initiative 
should be assessed in a positive way. 
•  An absolute necessity now is to strike a better balance between 
security and data protection concerns in view of the reservations 
expressed by the European Parliament and civil society. Over time, in 
pertinent texts – such as The Hague action plan, Stockholm 
Programme, Prüm Decision and the decision on Europol – increasing 
attention is being paid to data protection. It should be a priority for 
the Commission, as stated in the Stockholm Programme, to evaluate 
the functioning of the various instruments on data protection and 
where necessary, to present further legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives. The three presidencies have already ensured 
indispensable modifications to the Framework Decision 
(2008/977/JHA) on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.15 
On a practical level, a representation of EU data protection authorities 
could be invited to attend COSI meetings. 
•  On an institutional level, the roles of the European Commission and 
Parliament have increased. The European Parliament has a right of 
co-decision on most legislative matters except on measures covering 
operational cooperation on which it is consulted. National 
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of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350/60, 
30.12.2008. THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEN YEARS ON | 89 
parliaments also are part of the decision-making process, e.g. as 
regards Europol. The Commission has been invited to present an 
action plan pursuant to the Stockholm Programme as well as a 
communication on the European security strategy. It is essential that 
the Commission, Council trio presidencies, European Parliament and 
Council Secretariat organise their collaboration (who, what and 
when). In this regard, the European Parliament could ask that it is 
also more involved in the drawing-up of programmes, strategies, 
action plans, and where possible, soft legislation. In view of the new 
competences of the European Parliament, the relationship between 
the European Parliament and Europol should be defined. 
•  Operational cooperation has to be promoted and organised. The 
various agencies (Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, the European Anti-
Fraud Office and CEPOL) will have to coordinate their activities. 
Regional initiatives (e.g. the Baltic Sea Task Force, Salzburg Forum, 
Drugs Intelligence Centres in Lisbon and Toulon, and the Joint Police 
and Customs Centre in Luxembourg) have to be developed. The 
COSI has to steer this work and give the needed impulses. Better use 
should also be made of joint investigative teams. 
After the period of creativity (1995–2008) in police cooperation, it is 
now time for enhancing implementation of the existing instruments and 
improving the functioning of existing organisations. In this respect, the 
roles of the Chiefs of Police Task Force and CEPOL deserve special 
attention. The Chiefs of Police Task Force could be absorbed by COSI and 
CEPOL, or could become a part of Europol in the new phase of police 
cooperation, where coordination, streamlining, and the most efficient 
application of complex procedures and data protection should be priorities. 
Finally, in order to allow for some introspection and criticism, regular 
annual contact between decision-makers and leading academics could be 
very useful. 90 | 
 
 
11. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE 
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 
 E XTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
 K ARL VON WOGAU 
s a first reaction after the terrorist attacks against the twin towers in 
Manhattan, US President George W. Bush declared a “war against 
terrorism”. And it is true that some of the preparations had taken 
place in countries outside the US. In a world of global communications and 
transport it is not possible to draw a clear line between the internal and the 
external aspects of security. This is a basic fact we have to take into account 
when reflecting on homeland security in the European Union. 
The training camps of al-Qaeda are an important element of the 
threat coming from abroad. One of the reasons given in Germany for our 
engagement in Afghanistan is that Hindelang in Bavaria has to be defended 
in the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Meanwhile, the camps in Afghanistan 
have been destroyed, but we find them again in Pakistan, Yemen and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
Border controls are not a negligible element of homeland security in 
the US. Anyone who has made a trip to the US in recent years will confirm 
this point. In Europe, we have common external borders for goods, services 
and capital, and other external borders of the countries that belong to the 
Schengen area. This does not facilitate an efficient supervision of these 
borders. 
Efficient controls at the borders are very much dependent upon close 
cooperation among the authorities on both sides. At best, customs control 
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and border police should be housed in the same buildings to facilitate 
formal and informal exchanges of information. That is one of the reasons 
our European Neighbourhood Policy can be an important part of the 
security policy of the European Union. 
Another aspect of the external dimension of our security policy is the 
solidarity clause of the Treaty of Lisbon. It says that the Union and its 
member states shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is 
the object of a terrorist attack or subject to a natural or manmade disaster.1 
The Treaty affirms that in such a case the Union shall mobilise all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available 
by the member states. 
Is Europe a target for terrorists? 
Citizens of the European Union have a tendency to consider terrorism a 
threat that mainly concerns the US. They do not take into account that 
Islamic terrorism has clearly declared Europe as one of its targets. They 
forget the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid and the failed attacks in 
Germany. Additionally, we have to be aware of the number of European 
participants in terrorist training camps all over the world. 
We also have to take into consideration that the objectives of 
terrorism have changed. Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof and the Brigate 
Rosse had representatives of the state and industry as their targets. What 
they were looking for was what the Italians call cadaveri illustri. This has 
profoundly changed. Today’s terrorism threatens every citizen of our 
countries.  
The most worrying threat is the combination of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. As a warning from bioterrorism, we have 
seen the Aum sect in Japan using sarin and anthrax. Nuclear terrorism 
would be even more disastrous. Nuclear weapons in the hands of failed or 
irresponsible states would be a terrible threat. For the purpose of terrorism, 
they do not even need the full technology of missiles and enrichment. The 
use of what is called a ‘dirty bomb’ would be sufficient.  
I remember a simulation of such a terrorist event that was run for the 
Subcommittee for Security and Defence of the European Parliament. The 
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scenario was that the necessary material for a dirty bomb was smuggled 
into the territory of the European Union from an eastern country. The 
bomb was exploded in the vicinity of Brussels airport and we were 
confronted with a nuclear cloud moving across the Benelux countries in the 
direction of Germany.  
Just try to imagine the situation of the European Union and the 
member states when confronted with aggression of this kind. Nuclear 
material can be found mainly in territories where the supervision of the 
state does not function properly. This is one of the reasons the European 
security strategy considers failed states a major risk and why the external 
aspects of security cannot be neglected.  
The European security strategy 
In 2003, the heads of state and governments of the European Union decided 
upon a security strategy of the European Union, which had been 
formulated by Javier Solana. Since then, this strategy has been updated (in 
2008). 
This European security strategy was in a way an answer to the 
security strategy of the Bush administration, which was based on the idea 
of coalitions of the willing. The European strategy promotes an effective 
multilateral system based on the Charter of the United Nations, and holds 
that no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its 
own. 
At the time, the debate focused on the question of whether pre-
emptive strikes could be justified under certain conditions. The European 
Council finally agreed on the statement that in an era of globalisation, 
distant threats may be as much a concern as those close to home and that 
the first line of defence will often be abroad.2 
This statement is not only important for the external policy of the 
European Union but also for the further development of the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice of the European Union as foreseen in the 
Stockholm Programme. 
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Instruments of the European Union 
Security is not an exclusive task of the armed forces and the police. 
Diplomacy, prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, development and 
dialogue are important elements of the security policy of the European 
Union.  
The European Union disposes of a large number of instruments for 
maintaining peace and security. First and foremost is the External Action 
Service, which is at present being developed under the Treaty of Lisbon. 
This service will have to integrate the instruments for running civilian and 
military missions and to coordinate the security aspects of our 
neighbourhood and development policy. 
In addition, debates in the European Parliament have demonstrated 
that there is a close connection between security and development. Poverty 
and bad governance are breeding grounds for crime and terrorism, and a 
secure environment is a conditio sine qua non for any economic and social 
development. 
What recommendations for the future? 
The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon should be the occasion to 
improve the coordination of the different instruments that are at the 
disposal of the European Union. The External Action Service must be able 
to coordinate civilian and military missions of the European Union. The 
present instruments of analysis and planning have to be improved. 
The common protection of our ‘e-borders’ should be strengthened. 
We need common standards for the equipment necessary for border 
surveillance. The role of Frontex, the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, should 
also be enhanced. 
For mitigating natural and manmade disasters, we should implement 
the proposal for a civilian intervention force as proposed by Michel Barnier. 
This proposal was taken up in February 2010 by the European Parliament 
on the basis of the report of Arnaud Danjean. Such a force would be a 
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